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In 1985 the South African Law Commission published a Report 
entitled Women and Sexual Offences in South Africa. 1 The 
Report is the result of almost 3 years' research initiated 
at the request of the Minister of Justice in 1982. 
During the period 1979-1981 public attention in South Africa 
was drawn dramatically to the crime of rape. Me~ia reports 
focused on the high incidence and brutality of the crime and 
contributed towards a heightened sense of public anxiety and 
outrage. Slabbert 2 has argued convincingly that during this 
period the South African public e:<perienced a "moral pa.nit" 
regarding rape. Public concern extended to concern for the 
fate of rape victims and their treatment by the criminal 
justice agencies. This concern was voiced in Parliament. 
Questions were put to the Minister regarding the procedures 
involved in the laying of a rape charge and the medico-
forensic aspects of the crime. 3 As a result the Minister 
requested the South African Law Commission ta investigate 
these matters. The resultant Report was published in April 
1985. 
1. Project 45. 
2. 
3. 
Slabbert "Rape and Moral Panics" 





Assembly Debates Questions and Replies, cols 
511, 5 May 1982. See also House of Assembly 




Th~ initiation of an official investigation into rape-
related matters was a significant event for several reasons. 
It indicated a measure of sensitivity to public opinion and 
promised to provide much needed information on this 
neglected topic. Comparatively little research has been 
conducted into rape in South Africa. The absence of a 
national feminist movement and an apparent lack of concern 
by the criminal justice agencies have meant that rape does 
not enjoy a high profile as a social problem in comtemporary 
South Africa. Consequently, the initiation of an 
investigation into certain aspects of the crime indicated 
ti~ely official action. 
2 
Rape is a c6ntroversial topic involving broader issues such) 
! 
as the level of violence in a society, the social position~/ 
I 
of women and contemporary sexual mores. An investigationj 
into sexual offences in South Africa therefore provides the 
occasion for public debate and the formation of public 
opinion and can be viewed as an encouraging indication of 
state concern with these matters. In South Africa, where 
racial issues overshadow sexual ones, this is an unusual and 
apparently progressive step. The South African state rarely 
focuses attention on women as a group; the investigation 
provided South African women with an opportunity to debate 
issues whi¢h concern them. 
I 
The forum chosen for this debate was the South African Law 
Commission, a state-appointed body with a statutorily-based 
authority to conduct research and make recommendations ta 
the state on matters of legal reform. 4 The Commission can 
marshall considerable expertise, legal and otherwise, to its 
research purposes. Its findings make an important 
contribution to current knowledge about rape in South 
Africa. 
Knowledge is not produced in a vacuum but within particular 
social, political and institutional arrangements. The 
Report emerges as a response to public anxiety about rape 
and rape victims; it is produced by a body which is part of 
the wider public service of the state and it concerns a 
complex subject which raises questions concerning the very 
nature of gender relations in South Africa. It is the 
content of the knowledge produced by the Law Commission 
which is analysed in the present work. The analysis 
proceeds from a critical perspective; its aims are ta 
subject to critical scrutiny the method by which such 
knowledge was produced and to assess the significance of the 
Reper~ within the broader socio-political context in which 
it emerged. 
4. Sections 4 and 5 of the South African Law Commission 





Four major deficiencies have been identified in the Report. 
These relate to: 
1. The subject of inquiry 
2. Research method 
3. The aims and guiding principles of the investigation 
4. The perceived role of law reform. 
With full appreciation that these issues are closely 
interlinked, they will none the less be analysed separately 
in order to facilitate an in-depth critical inquiry. 
1. THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY 
Rigorous research demands as a prerequisite that the subject 
of the inquiry be defined and the area of the research be 
clearly demarcated: one must know what the problem is, and 
(a closely connected inquiry) where it is located. These 
questions are, of course, neither posed nor answered within 
a paradigmatic vacuum, but always from a particular 
theoretical position, whether articulated or not. These are 
crucial issues, shaping not only which research questions 
are posed, but also how they are posed. The definition and 
location of "the problem" to be investigated is thus of 
determinative importance in the generation of "knowledge" 
about it. The starting point not only directs the inquiry, 
but is a factor in determining its outcome. 
4 
The Commission's Report reveals quite clearly its 
uncertainty as to the subject, field and focus of inquiry. 
The Minister of Justice initially requested an investigation 
into the procedure for laying a rap~-~harge, and the medico-
legal aspects of rape. 1 The Commission subsequently decided 
to widen the scope of its inquiry to include related 
offences (hence the present title of' the Report). 2 Replies 
received by the Commission to its questionnaire indicated 
that other areas were perceived as meriting attention, viz 
the definition of rape, the 
irrebuttable presumption that a boy of less than 14 years is 
incapable of rape, and the responsibility of district 
surgeons. In addition, on the strength of representations 
made to it, the Commission included in its research ambit a 
range of related issues: the protection of the identity of 
the complainant and of juvenile witnesses, the time factor 
in the legal process, the possibility of adjudication of 
rape cases by the proposed Family Court, the attitude of 
judicial personnel, the role of crisis services and the 
relevance of the investigation to other sexual offences 
against women. The Commission therefore decided to 
investigate all of these issues. 3 
1. House of Assembly Debates Questions and Replies, cols 
509 and 511, 5 May 1982. See also House of Assembly 
Debates Questions and Replies, col 14, 2 April 1982. 
Report para 1'. 1. 
2. Report para 1.2. 
3. Report paras 1.2 and 1.4. 
5 
It is immediately apparent that the area of research 
ultimately demarcated extends far beyond the original brief 
to a very ambitious project. While no objection is made to 
this fact, it is equally apparent that the widening of the 
scope of inquiry is accompanied by a diffusion of research 
focus. The Commission not only canvassed for opinions, it 
allowed those opinions, which emanate from different sources 
with divergent concerns, to define the problems requiring 
investigation. 4 Those whose opinions were voiced indicated 
a predominant concern for the legal p~~c~ssing of rape cases 
and its eff~ct_s 0~1_the rape victim. One wonders, therefore, 
why the Commission saw fit to include recommendations on 
substantive lawe and the role of a crisis clinic.• 
The clearest encapsulation of the research topic and agenda 
is the following general statement: 
"It appears .•. that there is a particular need to 
deal with the yi~tim more symp~theti~@~ly ~nd to 
afford her gr~~ter protection in the process of 
-law. For this i~i~on t~1s investigation has 
concentrated on the victim as the starting-point, 
and the main point to be considered ultimately 
wi 11 therefore be whether the law and pr:o.c:.ess. of 
law relating to rape should be moc!ift~d or- -~m~mct..e_d 
so as to l?.!'.':.9-YL~~ f9r any special _pro~l~l_"!lS 
e:-:peri~n~ei:j ___ py rape vi!=tims. 117 
The Commission does not clarify what "the victim as the 
starting-point" means. Does it signify that concern· for her 
4. Report para 1.4. 
5. Report Chapter 2. 
6. Report Chapter 5 para 5. 
.., 
I • Report para 1. 9. 
6 
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welfare provided the motivation for the study? Or that ''the 
law and process of law" are to be analysed from her point of 
view? 
concern? 
Or that the victim herself is the central research 
It would appear that the first choice is the 
correct one, as the Report makes little attempt to analyse 
the law from her point of view. In addition, the Commission 
does not clarify what the perceived problems are. It rests 
content with vague and general references to the victim's 
"problems" and "trauma" or "alleged trauma". 9 
One concludes that the fundamental inquiry is into the 
natura_of the response ~y the criminal justice system to a 
complaint by a female that she has been raped. This is a 
complex and formidable task and, unfortunately, one which 
the Commission has not treated adequately. 
(i) The approach of the Commission 
The Commission's approach reveals a failure to contextualise 
the inquiry. It has not located its investigation within a 
widE:r und~':~~~~~!~~,L_gf the operation of the criminal justice 
system nor does it show any awareness of the r~J~tionsti!p 
_opera't:E!§.! 
The concept of a criminal justice system through which 
criminal cases are processed is almost wholly absent from 
8. See for• e:<ample Report paras 1.9, 1. 17, 2.1, 2.19 and 
5. 2. 
7 
the Report. This is a startling omission, in view of the 
Commission's o~.,n emphasis on the "process of law". 9 The 
criminal justice system can be conceptualised as a set of 
state-funded and state-controlled bureaucracies, viz the 
police, the prosecuting authorities, the courts and the 
8 
prisons, which, despite inherent 





the collective aim of law enforcement. 1 ~ Because the 
Commission does not recognise that the ultimate origins of 
rape lie in the patriarchal social stru~ture, 11 nor that the 
criminal justice bureaucracy forms an integral part of its 
social control machinery, it is precluded from recognising 
the contribution .of the criminal justice system to the 
problems of the rape victims. It can deal with these 
problems only in terms of the content of certain legal rules 
and the individual behaviour of law enforcement personnel. 
9. Report para 1.9. 
There is substantial body of literature on the 
criminal justice systems of Anglo-American 
Jurisdictions. See for example, Moody & Tombs: 
a 
Prosecution in the Public Interest (Scotland); Ericson 
& Baranek The Ordering of Justice: A Study of Accused 
Persons as D~pendants in the Criminal Justice System 
<Canada); Saunders & Daudistel The Criminal Justice 
Process (USA); Blumberg Criminal Justice (USA); Feeley 
The Process is the Punishment (USA>; Bottomly Decisions 
in the Penal Process (UK>; Bottoms & McLean Defendants 
in the Criminal Process <UK>; Carlen Magistrates' 
Justice <UK>; Baldwin & Mcconville Negotiated Justice 
(UK>; McBarnet Conviction: Law, the State and the 
Construction of Justice (UK). 
11. See infra 'The Treatment of the Victim'. 
! 
9 
This is, in fact, what the Commission has done. It 
concei. ves of the II l__eg.al II Rr:.oblems t,_Q!,_~JJ_y ____ '=>~P-~r::~te..1:L_f r~!!'-
the prob 1 em o·f the tr~atment qf the vi cttm._J:i_y the er: tm!.!:!.~!. 
seen as part of __ that treatment. In the Commission's view 
(operating within the particular institutional. s;~t:.ting) and 
the behaviour of the officials toward~ __ the __ vi~tim. The 
problem of the insensitive treatment of the victim is thus 
dealt with at the level of individual interaction. It is 
not perceived to be generated ~nd_?~~tained by th~ legal and 
institutional framework within which the behaviour occurs. 
For example, it is submitted here that the law of procedure 
and evidence in relation to rape cases clearly regards the 
complainant in a sexual case as different from other 
complainants: it expects her to follow a special complaint 
procedure; 13 it 6efines her sexual history as relevant 
evidence on which she can be cross-examined at length to 
12. See infra 'The Reform Proposals'. 
13. By way of an exception to the general rule against the 
admissibility of previous consistent statements, 
evidence of the fact that the complainant in a sexual 
crime complained of the incident shortly after it 
occurred, as well as the content of the complaint, is 
admissible, if the complainant gives evidence. Such 
evidence is not corroboration of the complainant's 
evidence, but is used to prove her consistency and 
therefore her credibility. The complainant must 
voluntarily complain at the first reasonable 
opportunity to someone to whom he or she could 
reasonably be expected to complain. See Hoffman and 
Zeffert South African Law of Evidence 3ed 22-26 and 
Schmidt Bewysreg 375-379. 
establish her character 14 and it proclaims that it is 
usually too dangerous to accept her evidence without some 
independent corroboration. 1 ~ In such a legal context, it is 
likely that the police, the district surgeon and the court 
officials will regard and therefore treat the rape victim 
differently from victims of other crimes. If the law itself -~-----···- -- •--• ·-·-
casts suspicion on her, then it is probable that those 
~h~rged with enforcing that law will do likewise, ev.en if 
they are QQJ'._ ___ ft,ll l y a~are of it. 
The "problem" to be investigated is thus not only diminished 
by its location in certain surface phenomena, ie the legal 
rules and behaviour of law enforcement officials, but is 
also subtly redefined. It is ~plit into a series of 
app~r~ntly disconnected problems such as the complaint 
requi r·ement, 1 "" the cautionary rule, 17 the medical 
examination, 1 s the laying of a complaint to the police, 1 ~ 
and so on. This <;9'-"'!§tJJ:µtes a distortion _q_f__J:.h§? _l,lflderlyif1g 
PL!=!t:!Jf?m which, from a critical perspective, lie?. __ p~rtly in 
the criminal ju~t~~~ ~y~tem itself. In this way, the 
14. Section 197 and s227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977. 
15. See t!. 1937 NPD 1; tl 1947 4 SA 489 < N> ; J.. 1966 1 SA 88 
<RAD> and Hoffman and Zeffert supra n13 455-456. 
16. Report paras 3.32 and 3.33. 
17. Report paras 3. 51-3. 71Z!. 
18. Report paras 5. 39··-5. 71!1. 
l. 9. Repc.1rt paras 5.6-5.38. 
definition and location of the problems to be investigated 
pave the way for Pi~~~~e~l reform, ie a tlnke~jng at the 
minutiae of 
y_ntouched. 
the system while the basic framework 
(ii) Recognising the e:dstence of "the problem" 
remains 
Even more disturbing, however, is the Commission's explicit 
doubt tt'iat "the problem" e:dsts at. al 1. A careful reading 
of the Report reveals that this doubt rests on four bases: 
(i) Popular concern with the incidence of rape in South 
Africa is due to alarmist media accounts, based on false 
statistics. 20 The statistics in question are a projected 
estimate, established by a certain statistical technique, of 
the total number of rapes occurring annually in South 
Africa. NICRO estimates that around 300 000 South African 
women are raped every year while, according to the official 
South African Police statistics, little more than 15 000 
rapes are reported annually. 21 This discrepancy raises the 
familiar issues of the "dark figure" of crime and the 
reliability of statistics. The Commission prudently advises 
caution in accepting the estimate without 
reservation, 22 and then proceeds to reject it completely. 
However, it accepts the police statistics without 
20. Report paras 1.6 and 1.7. 
21. Report paras 1.6 and 1.7. 
22. Report para 1.7. 
11 
reservation. Three reasons emerge from the Report: (a) the 
NICRO statistics are not reli.able; (b) the South African 
Police reject them; and (c) no empirical study of the "true" 
incidence of rape in South Africa has been carried out. 
The "dark figure" of crime is without doubt problematic. It 
includes instances of behaviour which would possibly be 
defined as criminal, but which remain undetected and it also 
includes those cases which are brought to the notice of law 
eriforcement agencies but which are not processed <when, for 
example, a policeman decides not to open a docket after a 
complaint is made). It is not known how much activity 
which could potentially be labelled as criminal if it were 
adjudicated upon by a court, actually occurs. Thgsg_~~ts 
which risk public disapproval and pun!shme~t ~r~.9~8~r~1Jy 
covert and secretive. There is a real strain towards their 
concealment23 from which the perpetrator be□~fits. There is 
therefore an elusive quality to much deviance and crime, 
making detection problematic in the absence of evidence (for 
e:<ampl e, a corpse indicating homicide or damaged premises 
indicating an illegal entry). 
suspected there may be any of 
However, even if a crime is 
several reasons for not - -----. - -- -·-··---
reporting it to the police, for instance, the ~~t. may be 
~ondoned or excused _in sympathy for the offender or lack of 
23. Downes and Rock Understanding Deviance 27. 
12 
sympathy for the victim. 24 So, for example, if the rape 
victim's family believes that she invited the attack in some 
way,. and therefore shares the blame for it, no report may be 
made to the police. The victim herself may be unable or 
unw~lling'_to define the event as rape. 2 s Alternatively, the 
perception that the police are uninterested or ineffective 
or hostile may prevent a report being made. Any or all of 
24. Amir Patterns in Forcible Rape concludes that the 
following reasons are most commonly involved in the 
concealment ~f rape: 
(a) Parents wish to prevent further emotional injury 
and ordeal to a young victim which an investigation and 
criminal trial would entail 
Cb) ~hame, fear of blackmail and the ~ish to protect 
reputation 
(c) adult victims who are not severely injured wish tq 
forg~_t the incident and ~void ·further ordeal 
(d) the victim refuses to be bothered and to lose time 
by prosecution 
(e) the victim her·self is accuseq ____ of ______ acti_ve 
participatton or prqyqcation of the incident 
(f) f_ear ___ of the off ender 
<g > f ~ar of recri mi nation. by th~ _f_~~!_l y 
(h) a _wistl t.o prqtei:::t th~ qffen.der:_ .!'!h~n there e:<is~? a 
special relationship,between him ~n~_the victim. 
Cited in Viano (ed) Victims and Society 392. 
25. Weis and Borges "Victimology and Rape: The Case of the 
Legitimate Victim'' 1973 8 Issues in Criminology 71-115, 
contend that t..bg _J_e.<.?s. h~r_ e;~p~r:j 1;tni;;_g_c;;qr:rt=$pc::>nd~L to the 
prevailing vie~ _gf __ ~ape as a brutal attack by a 
stranger:, the more difficult it_is for her and others 
to define her experience as rape. Cited in Walker and 
Brodsky (eds) Sexual Assault 136. See also Curtis 
"Present and Future Measures of Victimization in 
Forcible Rape" in Walker and Brodsky (eds) 61-68, 65. 
13 
I 
these factors may be operative in a particular community and 
may_contribute to under-reporting of suspected crimes. The 
dark figure of crime is an unknowable figure and 
consequently only projected estimates of this amount are 
possible. 
This does not, however, render the estimate totally useless 
as the Commission supposes. One method of shedding light on 
the matter is the self-report study or victimization 
study2 • which gathers data directly from self-confessed but 
undetected offenders or from the victims themselves. Before 
dismissing the figure as irrelevant, the Co~mission should 
have attempted to obtain some data from rape victims. A 
victimological survey of instances of sexual aggression is 
the best source of information on the incidence of non-
reporting. 27 The effort, time and expense undoubtedly 
required for such an enterprise are more than justified. 
This data is crucial to the whole project, as it would shed 
some light on the existence <or otherwise) and extent of the 
dark figure. In view of this it is difficult to understand 
26. See, for •xample, Hindelang & Davis, "Forcible Rape in 
the United States: A Statistical Profile" in Chappell, 
Geis & Geis (eds) Forcible Rape: The Crime, the Victim 
and the Offender 87-114, 97-98. 
14 
27. Hindelang Criminal Victimization in Eight American 
Cities: A descriptive analysis of common theft and 
assault 358, writes: "The victimization survey is the· 
most practical vehicle available for analysing factors 
associated with the decisions of victims regarding 
whether or not to call the police when they believe 
that they have been victimized.". 
I 
the Commission's failure even to attempt to solicit any 
information from rape victims. 
A victimological study recently conducted in the Cape 
Peninsula28 demonstrated that many rape victims failed to 
report their victimizations to the police. Of a total 
number of 1 252 victimizations29 during the period covered 
by the survey, only 31,7% were reported. On 1 y 51 , 7% of 
rapes and attempted rapes were reported to the police. 30 
The most frequent reason given far not reporting a 
victimization was stated to be fe~~ __ pf_~~v~nge by the 
aggr~s~or (27,3% of respon~es). The next most frequent 
reason given was the belief that th~ police would be unable 
to appr~her~d ___ the aggressor (19,2% of respanses). 31 Other 
South African victimolagical studies also indicate high 
rates of non-reporting. 32 
28. Strijdom ''A victimological study among Coloureds in the 
Cape Peninsula" (unpublished PhD thesis), Rhodes 
29. 
University 1982. 
Incidents of robbery, common 
assault, rape and attempted 
investigated in the survey. 
30. Strijdom supr• n28 111. 





32. See Strijdam and Schurink Prim~re viktimisasie in 
Soweto: 27,2% of victimizations were reported; Boshoff 
"Misdaadviktimisasie" in U~tter, Strijdom, Schurink et 
& Eersterust: 'n Sasiologiese studie van 'n 
Kleurlinggemenskap: 40% of victimizations were 
reported; Strijdom and Bashoff Die omvang van die 
rapporteerinq van misdaad deur Blankes, Kleurlinge en 
Indilrs: 48,7% of victimizations of whites, 48,7% of 
victimizations of coloureds and 62,4% of victimizations 
suffered by Indians were reported ta the police. 
15 
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That the South African Police reject the projected figure of 
rape should come as no surprise. The police are interested 
parties and it is hardly likely that the official agents of 
law enforcement would readily accept that victims of a 
capital crime regularly refrain from reporting its 
occurrence to them. In any event, the police can hardly be 
expected to know the incidence of non-reporting. The 
opinion of the South African Police regarding the projected 
estimate is consequently irrelevant to the question of the 
"true'' figure of rape and should not have influenced the 
Commission in any way. 
The lack of empirical data on this issue is a telling 
indication of general lack of concern with the crime and its 
victims in South Africa. While this is a serious matter 
requiring urgent attention, it is not the fatal flaw the 
Commission assumes it to be. The Commission refused to 
consider the weighty body of cross-cultural and cross-
jurisdictional data on rape and rape victims, apparently on 
16 
I 
the basis of their irrelevance to South Africa. 33 It is 
noteworthy that this is the ground on which the South 
African Police reject the applicability of the projected 
estimate of actual rapes (believed to be based on estimates 
in other countries): 
"because of our totally 
and the heterogeneous 
population with its own 
customs." 34 
different social set-up 
composition of the 
peculiar cultures and 
The meaning of this phrase is obscure. It makes the vital 
connection between rape, social structure and culture, but 
only to emphasise South Africa's "total" difference from 
other parts of the world. Exactly what these differences 
are perceived to be, why they are so extreme and why they 
are assumed to account for less rape, is nowhere elucidated. 
The South African social formation is not so ~niqu~ that it 
has nothing in common, ___ ~i.th societi~'.§ __ ~!s~Y'!h~re. The society 
is deeply divided along class, race and sex lines. It is 
33. See Report para 1.7. See further para 2.3 where ~he 
Commission criticizes those who urge a redefinition of 
the crime along the lines proposed by reformers in 
America and Canada for overlooking completely the 
"fact" that "our criminal law does not have the same 
basis as those systems and is not codified''. This 
criticism is inapposite: the law relating to rape in 
America, Canada and South Africa is based on English 
common law and, until reformed in Canada and some 
American states, was very similar in both its 
.---------.substantive and procedural aspects. The Cammi ssi on 
however, misses the point that the cruc~~~ 5~sue in }~w 
reform is_ n9t the similarity between_ these systems but 
whether reforms similar to those introduced elsewhere 
can meet the social needs of South Africa. 
34. Report para 1.7. 
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racist, in that it formally distinguishes its members on the 
basis of their race and singles out the different races for 
different and unequal treatment. 3 e It has marked class 
stratification, which runs along racial lines. 3 b It is a 
sexist society which entrenches its female members in 
positions of inequality relative to its male members. 37 The 
structures of racism and sexism are supported by a dominant 
ideology of male supremacy which are reinforced by the state 
and its apparatuses. The racism, however, is white racism 
and the sexism is male sexism. The interlocking of these 
two lines of stratification have created a complex society 
in which power, authority and the greatest economic rewards 
are consistently channeled to the elite group of ruling 
white males. The intersection of race, c 1 ass and se:-: 
35. See for example, the Population Registration Act 30 of 
1950; The Black Land Act 27 of 1913; The Black 
Administration Act 30 of 1927; The Development Trust 
and Land Act\18 of 1936; The Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act 49 of 1953; the Group Areas Act 36 of 
1966. 
36. See Lipton Apartheid and Capitalism in South Africa 
1911~-1984 and Posel "Rethinking the 'race/class' debate 
in South African historiography" 1983 9(1) Social 
Dynamics 51~-66. 
,,.,.,----
37. While, as a general statement, this is tr~e for all 
South African women, it is particularly the case for 
Black women who are subjected to both common law and 
customary law. Their capacity to act as full legal 
subjects has been severely restricted and their 
structured dependence on men perpetuated. See, far 
example, Qolo v Ntshini 1950 NAC 234 (S); Ndinisa v 
Mtuzulu 1963 BAC 74 <S>; M6antsha v Ngoloukulu 1952 NAC 
40 CS); Ndhlovu v Ndhlovu 1954 NAC 59 (NE>; Ngcobo v 
Nqcobo 1946 NAC <N & T> 14. 
18 
stratification identifies black women as the most oppressed 
grg~~-!n our society. 
Bozzoli 38 in an analysis of modern, patriarchal South 
Africa, argues that South African society displays a 
"patch~-iork quilt of patriarc:hies". She attempts to identify 
specific forms of patriarchy within the white Afrikaner 
group, the English-speaking group and amongst indigenous 
peoples. 
"The forging of modern patriarchy thus must be 
interpreted as the result of the interplay between 
the process of state formation on the one hand; 
and the 'historical givens' of the pre-existing 
societies in the region on the other. This lends 
tremendous complexity to the analysis which needs 
to be undertaken. For do we asssert that 'one 
patriarchy' exists, because of the emergence of a 
single central state, and the passing of most 
lines of domination and subordination through that 
state; or do we retain some notion of 'many' 
patriarchies, because of the historical and 
cultural specificity of the experience and 
resultant social position, of men and women of 
different groups? Tentatively, I wish to suggest 
that the notion of many patriarchi~s needs to be 
retained, with qualifications, for the modern 
era. u::sc;, 
It is suggested that the following analysis of white 
patriarchy and rape in America is apposite also to South 
Africa: 
"All women, regardless of race-ethnicity, live in 
a white, male-dominated society where the dynamics 
of male-female interaction are convoluted by the 
dynamics of racial power. In a racially and 
38. Bozzoli "Mar:<ism, Feminism and Studies" 1983 9 (2) 
Journal of Southern African Studies 139-171. 
39. Bozzoli supra n38 155. 
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se:{ually ~;tr.i1ti.fi1:.1d f.nciPi'>', ~ l1i(:Jh irH·idi::>n,···~ nf 
rape is predictable. Rape symbolizes not only a 
key element of social control working to maintain 
the system, but also the anger and violence 
engendered by such a system. Females are 
victimized several times over. [White] females are 
potentially appropriate victims for [white] males 
and are vulnerable to ... rape by [black] males, 
,the latter •.. symbolizing some of the anger and 
frustration that grows so naturally in a system of 
unequal power. [Black] females appear to be 
appropriate victims of both inter- and intragroup 
rape. If they are raped by white males, it is 
assumed that they "asked for it" or ,..,ere simply 
unpaid prostitutes." 4 .zt 
Curtis41 suggests that in black intragroup rape the rapist 
may unconsciously imitate the white male. This rape is "the 
symbolic e:<pression of the white male hierarchy". 
If one accepts that the incidence of rape as one form of 
violence is inextricably linked to the general level of 
violence in a saciety, 42 then it follows that the South 
• 
African social formation could be gen~rating a high 
incidence of rape. South Afr·ica's "special" circumstances 
coulci therefore produce illQ!'.::.st rape than in other societies, 
40. Williams & Halmes The Second Assault 27. 
41. Curtis "Rape, Race and Culture: Some Speculations in 
Search of a Theory" in Walker· and Brodsky (eds) supra 
n25 117-132, 131. 
42. Schwendinger and Schwendinger Rape and Inequality 155 
suggest that sexual inequality and rape are related tb 
the general level of violence in a society. This level 
is itself generated by the political economy, 
particularly by the articulation between the capitalist 
made of production and precapitalist types of 
production. Bowker Women, Crime and the Criminal 
Justice System 120 notes the high statistical 
correlation between the official rate of violent crime 
and rape and interprets this data as a suggestion that 
"there must be a general violence factor ... in any 
comprehensive e:<planation of se:-:ual assault". 
21!1 
not less, as the Commission assumes. The structural and 
cultural preconditions for this to occur are clearly present 
in South Africa. 
The structur·al location of black wome~, wh!~~_exc~udes them 
from sources of wealth and power and encourages their 
dependence on men makes this group the most vulnerable to 
.".':~Pe by both black and white males. Black culture also 
The customary sustain a marked se:<ual inequality. 
institutions of marriage, bridewealth, divorce and 
succession entrench the inferior status of black women 
relative to that of black men. 43 l~~Jg~~ous culture also 
promotes_female submission to the social and moral authority 
43. Marks and Unter-halter "Women and the Migrant Labour 
System in Southern Africa'' <unpublished paper 1978) 
emphasise the point that in virtually all Bantu-
speaking societies women are "subject to the tight 
control of chiefs, headmen and the heads of families". 
Cited in Bozzoli supra n38 149. 
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of men. 44 Such submission may well be conducive to rape 
In addition to ignoring these factors, the Commission has 
also ignored the fact that the law and criminal justice 
system in So~~h Africa has much in common with that of other 
countries. The South African law of rape is received law, 
similar to the common law of Anglo-American jurisdictions. 
R_ape _cases are proc~:§~_~d_ t_hrC:>ugh remarkably similar criminal 
justice systems. These systems are composed of mandatory, 
institutionalised agencies of law enforcement which are 
operated and controlled by predominantly white, middle-
class, state-paid officials, who are also men. 4 • In the 
44. See Bennett "The Status of African Women in Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia'' (unpublished PhD thesis) University of Cape 
Town 1980. See Schapera Married Life in an African 
Tribe and Longmore The Dispossessed: A Study of the Sex 
Life of Bantu Women in and around Johannesburg. 
45. Armstrong "A note on several aspects of rape in 
Swaziland'' 1986 XIX CILSA 474-488, 475 cites a senior 
counsel in a Swaziland rape case: "In every African 
society •.. a person from childhood is taught the 
importance of obeying and respecting their elders and 
people who are in authority. What does a girl of 10, 
12 or even 14 years do when called by an adult male and 
ordered to remove her panties and lie down? Can she 
disobey without thinking that she is going against 
parental teachings?" Similarly, Schaper-a, supra n44 
found that the husbands' use of their sexual rights in 
respect of their wives was "a common-place feature of 
Kgat 1 a married· 1 if e-: . -· The men,-· however, fake . up th-e 
attitude that intercourse is a duty every wci~~~--o~es to 
her huslian-d - and that ... she. must - carry. it out 
faithfull_y.... 'These women cannot stop us; ·:c·was 
told; 'we have given bogadi (bridewealth) for them and 
so we._are entitled_to make us~ of t~_~Jr bodi~s'." Cited 
in Janssen-Jurreit Sexism: The Male Monopoly on History 
and Thought 235. 
46. See the references supra n10. 
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light of these factors a comparative appraisal would have 
contributed greatly to an problems 
experienced by F~pe victims. Foreign data is no substitute 
for South African data on rape, but it is submitted that the 
Commission was misguided in rejecting knowledge from other 
jurisdictions as totally irrelevant to South Africa for the 
obscure reason which is cited above. On the contrary, it is 
contended here that the Commission ought to have taken 
cross-cultural data into account. 
(iii) Cross-cultural research 




are not reported to the ___ po_1.__i ce, 47 though 
the e:<tent of the under-reporting vary 
S~yer@l factors could play a role in the 
decision to report or not to report: the age, ___ ~~rital 
status and structural location 
47. Bowker, supra n42, 103 documents that a 1965-66 survey 
of self-reports of crimes conducted by the National 
Opinion Research Center found a much higher rate of 
self-report crimes than officially noted in the 
statistics. The NORC found that the most underreported 
of all crimes was rape, for which the NORC self-report 
rate was nearly four times the official rate of the 
Uniform Crime Reports. While caveats similar to those 
mentioned in respect of official statistics are 
apposite in respect of these rates, the discrepancy 
between the self-report rates and the official rates 
indicates a significant number of unreported rapes. 
See also Curtis supra n25 63-5; Hindelang and Davis 
supra n26, 97; Katz and Mazur Understanding the Rape 
Victim 185-186 and references cited therein. 
23 
the event itself and the v!_<:~i_f!l~~--relationship with the 
The nature of the relationship between the victim and the 
assailant is an impo~t~nt_ factor in the decision to report 
the incident. 48 Research indicates that many rapes occur 
between aquai ntances and between family members. 4 • A pr_!_or 
relations~ip of some kind with the assailant ~~y ~~t~_the 
v~ctim unwil~ing to ~eport the event.em Par:ticul.~~·ly in 
the ~amily con~~xt, the family may be unwilling to press 
charges against a father or other male relative for the rape 
of a child of the family. In jurisdictions which recognise 
the marital rape exemption, the husband may rape his wife 
with impunity, and these cases are not reported or, if 
reported, are not proceeded with due to the 1 egal 
( 
impossibility of conviction. At most, the husband may be 
convicted of assault, which will distort the statistical 
data on rape. Studies have shown, however, that despite the 
f~~quent occurrence of marital violence the police are 
loath to intervene in what they perceive to be an 
48. Williams "The Classic Rape: When do Victims Report?" 
1984 31 (4) Social Problems 459-467, 460, and 
references cited therein. 
49. In Amir's study, supra n24, only 42% of the reported 
rapes in Philadelphia during the period 1958-1960 were 
committed by strangers. Other victimisation surveys 
indicate differing rates of rape by strangers. See 
Bowker supra n42, 112. 
5121. Schwendinger and Sc:hwendi nger "Rape Victims and the 
False Sense of Guilt'' 1980 13 (Summer) Crime and Social 
Justice 4-17; Weis and Borges supra n25. 
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es~~n!!~lly p~ivate matter.~ 1 Consequently, it is probable 
that a significant number of instances of marital rape is 
hidden from public view and cannot be represented in the 
official rape statistics. 
Other reasons for not reporting rape have been clearly 
voiced by the victims themselves: their reaction of shqct, 
shame or embarr~ssment at having been raped may prevent them 
from speaking about it, often for many years.~ 2 There is 
the phenomenon of the rape victim's "irrational" feeling of 
the perception that she somehow invited 
the attack and is consequently ear~j~lly -~~§ponsi~!e for it. 
The resultant feeling of shame and_ ~ ~ 5._gra<:e, of ten shared by 
the wider community of family and ( friends, is enough to 
silence the victim in many cases.e3 Fear of blame or 
rejection by husband or family may have the same effect. 
The most notable characteristic of rape victims has been 
their silence -~nd_~'!visi_t:l!lity. The confession of having 
been raped is in many instances an invitation to social 
51. See, for example, Scutt (ed) Violence in the Family: 
Gel 1 es The Vi cl ent Home; Finkel her and Yl 1 o "Forced Se:< 
in Marriage: A Preliminary Research Report" 1982 28(3) 
Crime and Delinquency 459-478; Bowker supra n42 125; 
British House of Commons Report on Violence in Marriage 
(1976) vol 1; Freeman "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife 
Who[mJ Can You Rape? The Marital Rape Exemption Re-
l e:<amined. 11 1981 Family Law Quarterly 1; Schapera 
l Married Life in an African Tribe. 
52. See Macdonald Rape Offenders and Their Victims. 
53. See Russell The Politics of Rape 25-34 and 62-67; Weis 
and Borges supra n25; Burgess and Holmstrom "Coping 
behavior of the rape victim" 1976 113 American Jour-nal 
of Psychiatry 413-418. 
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disaster. In addition, there may be ~ore practical reasons 
for not reporting the rape: fear of retaliation by the 
assailant,e 4 lack of confidence in the abllity of the 
criminal justice system to apprehend and punish the 
assailant,~~ or lack of time to participate in a criminal 
prosecution.e.s. 
Other victims decide differently but their compl_aint? are 
not always accepted as valid by the police. Some of those 
who attempted to report the rape and press charges were 
unable to proceed when the police, who perform an initial 
screening function, decided /that they had no case and 
dismissed the matter.e7 Victims whose cases have gone to 
trial have e:-:pressed the view that had they known what they 
•-.... -·-··-·--····· 
would have to endure in the criminal justice process they 
would probably not have proceeded. The process included the 
-··-· _. ________ ---· - ·-·· - -------··-· .. 
detailed, repetitive interrogation by disbelieving or 
insensitive policemen, the humiliating medical examination 
and the exposure of her prior sexual conduct in court. 
54. See Strijdom, supra n28, 112. 
55. Ashworth and Feldman-Summers "Perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system" 1978 5 
Cri~inal Justice and Behaviour 227-240; Feldman-Summers 
and Ashworth "Factors related to the intentions to 
report rape'' 1981 37(4) Journal of Social Issues 53-70. 
56. Kidd and· Cha.yet "Why Do Victims Fail to Report'? The 
Psychology of Criminal Victimiz~tion'' 1984 40 Journal 
of Social Issues 39-50 and Amir supra n24. 
57. Clark and Lewis Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality 
34-38; Mayne and Levett "The Traumas of Rape - Some 
Consi derat i ans" 1977 1 SACC 163-1 71ll. 
These factors, combined with high acquittal rates, make the 
prosecution of a rape case a most unattractive proposition 
·for the victim. 
One can attempt to understand these phenomena at various 
levels and from different points of view. It is argued here 
that the theoretical perspective which has the greatest 
explanatory power is one which relates these phenomena to 
Several studies indicate that the common stock of social 
knowledge about rape includes a variety of sometimes 
contradictory beliefs about the nature of the event and the 
nature of women. These beliefs, which are inimical to the 
interests of rape victims, include the following: 
that rape is a rare occurrence; 
(ii) 
(ii i ) 




that rape is a sudden, violent attack -----·------·---- ···- -----------
str~nger in a deserted pu~Jic pl~~e; 
~ontrollable ~exual drive; 
that women secretly want to be_~aped; 
that rape is precipitated by the 
attractiveness of the victim; 




(viii) that mariy ___ rape charges ____ !3-r•_~ false and must be 
treated with caution.es 
These beliefs form part of the dominant ideology of. rape and 
structure our common sense notions abo4~_lt ■ "Common sense" 
is the form in which the dominant_ ideology is trans~itted 
and !Jlaintain1_=d. It con st i tut es_ the 1 ens thr-ougt, _ which 
In the light of these 
social beliefs, the perceptions and behaviour of those 
victims who feel disgraced and shamed and what is often seen 
as the "insensitive" behaviour by law enforcement agents 
become understandable: they share the dominant social 
understanding of rap~ and hay:e _____ j__rtt;§!r:nal i?E?ci ___ Jt~ ____ yalµ~ 
Perhaps the most insidious of these beliefs is found in the 
si;:~r:~o-t:,ype_ of ____ the "true rape": that rape is an une:<pected, 
vicious attack by a stranger in a deserted public place. A 
con~~ptu~~isi~g ~~- rape an event which_does_not_conform_~o 
for S:<ample, rape __ occurring ___ between 
acquaint:,~Q..c;.!¥? t n_ the home of t-h~ __ yJ_i;_:t: i m. Research i ndi cat es 
58. See MacKellar Bape: The Bait and the Trap for an 
examination of these myths. The Law Commission Report, 
para 5.2, notes the exi~ten~~ of_ c~rtain rape myths, 
but declines to comment on them. 
28 
I 
"true rape_". Not only does this influence the !~gal 
processing of rape cases, but it is also a factor 
contributing toward _ non~reporting. A woman who does not 
icien:t.~iY herself as a victim has nothing _to _r:~p<:Jr:t t:.o the 
police. The available data suggests that the more the 
circumstances of the rape correspond to the "true rape" 
notion, the more likely it is that victims will perceive 
themselves as such•2 and the more likely they will be to 
report the rape to the police.•3 
What "everybody knows" about rape thus canst i tut es __ a _rape 
mythplqgy_~hich may be devastating to the victim. 






59. Clark and Lewis supra n57, 57-66; 1968 117 University~ 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 277-322; Feldman-Summers and 
Palmer "Rape: A view from Judges, prosecutors, and 
police officers'' 1970 7 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 
19-41?J. 
60. See infra 'The Reform Proposals' footnote 177. 
61. Burt "Cultural myths and supports for rape" 198(!1 38 ✓ 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 217-230; 
Feild "Attitudes towards rape: A comparative analysis 
of police, rapists, crisis counsellors and citizens" 
1978 36 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
156-179. 
62. Weis and Barges supra n25. 
63. Williams supra n48. This factor may distort 
significantly the official rape statistics and 
strengthen social belief in the stereotype. 
I 
"Myth fulfils... an indispensable function: it 
ejpr:e'?ses, enhal"\c~s ______ §'li!? __ i:::9difies beliefs, it 
s~feguards and enforces morality, it V_P-1_..l_<;h~? for 
the efficiency of ritual _and_contains eractical 
rules for the guidalice of ~~n. Myth is thus a 
vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not 
~n idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; it 
is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic 
imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive 
faith and moral wisdom.• 4 
types of behaviour as acceptable or unacceptable a~~~r~~ng 
to an encoded set of moral beliefs and may have profound 
effects on social organisation. Contemporary society ~--~--- not 
f r~~~ __ 9f_ lllyths, p.3.r·t i s_1_.:1_l§\rJ y those SL1rround i ng the nature and 
behaviour of women. Mythology pr_-1:>vid~? the conceptual 
machinery ___ to maintain the dominant symb~~-~c _______ Ltr:1_~ verse. 
Berger and Luckmann contend that knowledge which is 
mythological in form is closest to the narve level of the 
symbolic universe, ie "the level on which there is the least 
necessity for theoretical universe maintenance beyond the 
actual positing of the universe in question as an objective 
reality". •e 
The success and continued existence of rape myths do not 
depend on their relation to the "facts" about women but to 
their relation to the power of those who maintain the myths. 
Rape mythology, then, can survive despite the generation of 
inconsistent "facts" about women. When internalised by the 
64. Malinowski Myth in Primitive Psychology 19. 
65. Berger and Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality 
128. 
I 
victim, it may be a powerful yet unseen force militating 
against the reporting of rape. 
enforcement agents, it may_ inf!~~'::'£=~ th~ir behaviou!" towards 
the victim and the manner in which the case is proce~sed. 
In many ways, it may play an important role in the 
constr·uction of a "stx·ong" or "weak" case against the 
accu5ed. 6 h 
The research which has attempted to reveal the cultural 
support for rape behaviour is relevant to South Africa. 
Having identified South Africa as a patriarchal soci~ty, 
albeit with its own specific forms of male rule, it is 
evident that the CLtlt;~r-_-§q __ pr_~-:--_q:mdit:.iol"!~ f9r~ the emergence 
of _!1 _ s;}_mi l ar r~pe mythology are pre-.;e11_t. It would be 
astonishing if South African society did not share in the 
received wisdom of rape (also encoded into the law itself) 
and if the predominantly white, male law enforcement 
officials wer- not influenced by it. It is submitted that 
it is hardly tenable that factors similar to those mentioned 
above are not operative in South Africa and do not 
contribute towards low report figures. 
The Commission is correct in one respect: a South African 
study is required which will attempt to indicate how, and to 
what extent, these factors contribute to the non-reporting 
of rapes. But until such time, we cannot facilely dismiss 
66. McBarnet Conviction: Law, the 
Construction of Justice, 79-101. 
State and the 
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these considerations as of no relevance, as the Commission 
has clearly done. This empiricist position precludes a 
serious consideration of the possibility of a wide 
discrepancy between the number of reported and actual rapes 
and it obscures the social factors that might be 
structurally and systematically generating this discrepancy. 
Structural and cultural forces could, in fact, sustain a 
strong bias against reporting, so that reported cases of 
rape constitute the exception and not the norm. 
From the feminist perspective, in which rape is perceived as 
a social control practice, it is to be expected that there 
will be a high incidence of unreported rape, a large number 
of reported cases rejected by the police as credible, a high 
dropout rate in the filtering process of the criminal 
justice system and a low conviction rate in completed cases. 
These do not represent dysfunctions in the criminal justice 
system. On the contrary, if violence against women is to be 
an effective device for controlling women, it must be both 
possible and probable. The law relating to rape must 
attempt to secure this.state of affairs. Cla~k and Lewis in 
a recent Canadian •tudy identified the operation of the 
above-mentioned factors and concluded that they amount to a 
de facto decriminalisation of rape in Toronto. The authors 
provide the following statistical picture: 
''We believe that a rape had most likely occurred 
in 104 of the 116 cases we studied. If only 40% 
of all rapes are reported <the highest of all 
estimated reporting rates), then these 104 
reported rapes represented the approximately 260 
32 
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rapes which actually occurred. The police 
classified only 42 of the 116 rapes as founded, 
and arrested 32 suspects. Given an average 
conviction rate of 51.2%, approximately 17 
suspects were probably convicted. Thus only 17 
out of approximately 260 rapists are likely to be 
convicted in Metropolitan Toronto - only 7%. That 
is the highest estimate that any of the figures, 
at any stage of the process, would justify. As 
such, it stands as something of a monument to 
injustice, and a serious indictment of our 
criminal justice system. "6. 7 
The fact that some rapists ill.':..§. convicted is highly 
significant. The system cannot survive intact if it is too 
blatantly unjust. It must, therefore, while serving 
predominantly male. interests, appear to be fair and, in 
fact, on occasion, serve womenjs interests to maintain 
legitimacy. 
Having wrung its hands in despair at the lack of "factual" 
information it is no surpris~ that the Commission hastily 
heads for the safety of official police statistics. It is 
the Commission's belief that these statistics are a 
substantially accurate reflection of the number of rapes 
actually occurring.•a Nowhere is this reliance justified; 
apparently their status as official statistics suffices. 
The Report displays no awareness of the substantial problems 
surrounding official crime statistics. First, the official 
rape statistics are at most a record of crimes known to the 
police and they cannot account for the dark figure of the 
67. Clark and Lewis supra n57, 57. 
68. Report para 1.8. 
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crime.•• Secondly, it is contended that the official 
statistics cannot be conceived of as simply passive 
responses by officials to criminal acts, as the Commission 
believes. Kitsuse and Cicourel, 7 ~ in their criticism of 
traditional deviancy theory, which embodies this assumption, 
point out that this view fails to distinguish between social 
conduct which produces a unit of behaviour· <the "beha.viour-
producing process'') and the organisational activity which 
produces a unit in the rate of that deviant behaviour (the 
"rate-producing p_rocess") on the assumption that the former 
accounts for the latter. 
"Thus, rates can be viewed as indices of 
organizational processes rather than as indices of 
the incidence of certain forms of behaviour. 1171 
In other words the official rape statistics are an 
indication of what the police are doing about rape and not 
how many rapes are actually occurring. 
Several implications flow from this insight. It does not 
signify that police statistics are inaccurate and are 
69. Downes and Rock supra n23, 45-46 note that there are 
certain crimes which may be more accurately reflected 
in the statistics than others, such as theft of insured 
goods. In such a case a report must be made in order 
for the insured to claim. 
71Il. Kitsuse and Cicourel "A note on the use of statistics" 
1963 11 Social Problems 131-139. 
71. At 137. See also Bottomly and Coleman Understanding 
Crime Rates 11; Van Zyl Smit "Die Hanter·i ng van 
Amptelike Misdaadstatistiek in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Kriminologie" 1977 1 SACC 123-134. 
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therefore of limited, or no reliability. As Black72 notes, 
while it is wrong to assume they can account for the "real" 
crime rate, the statistics are themselves not "wrong". They 
are an aspect of social organisation. A crime rate is an 
empirical ph~nomenon with its own existential integrity. 73 
It is a product of police action. Its meaning cannot be 
grasped without an understanding of police interrogation 
procedures, 74 charging practices, routine evidence-gathering 
methods and common-sense assumptions. 7 ~ Consequently, the 
official rape statistics reveal more about the behaviour of 
the criminal justice personnel in regard to rape than about 
its actual occurrence. The production of the statistics is 
the production of public knowledge about rape and makes an 
important contribution to the dominant definition of rape 
either as a social problem or as a private trouble for the 
victim. 
72. Black "Production of Crime Rates" 1971lJ 35 American 
Sociological Review 733-748, 734. 
73. Black supra n72, 734. 
74. See Downes and Rock supra n23, 46. 
75. In the words of Cicourel The Social Organization of 
Juvenile Justice 28-29: 
"The meaning of official statistics, therefore, 
must be couched in the context of how men, 
resources policies and strategies of the police 
for example cover a given community, interpret 
incoming calls, assign men, screen complaints, and 
routinize reports.... The set of meanings 
produced by ex post facto readings of the 
statistical records cannot be assumed to be 
identical to the situational meanings integral to 
the various stages in the assembly of official 
stc,i.tistj_cs." 
35 
(ii) The second ground upon which the Commission bases its 
doubt as to the e:dstence of a "rape problem" is its view 
that concern for rape victims is misplaced. Such concern, 
in its opinion, is simply part of the strategy of 
(unidentified) feminist organisations to improve the status 
of women. It is "purely a reflection of the activities of 
women's organizations elsewhere and of a much wider and 
deeper debate on social change and sexual morality which has 
been going on since the sixties and seventies in other parts 
of the Western World .•• ". 76 Rape is correctly identified as 
a feminist issue. The Report suggests, however, that 
feminists who tackled the rape issue were not really 
concerned with sound legal reform. They merely created 
utilized a rape controversy for their own purposes 
changing the se:-:ual status qua: 
" ••• it is evident. that the initiative for reform 
Cin other countries] in mast cases arose from an 
ideological involvement with the campaign far an 
improvement in the status of women, rather than 
from an honest appraisal of defects in existing 
law and practice." 77 
and 
of 
The implication is clear: feminists are too biased towards 
their own cause to detect real weaknesses in the law. Rape 
is only a symbolic rallying point for feminist activists 
and, had they been less biased and dishonest in their 
criticism of existing law, their criticisms would not have 
been made. Feminist groups are thereby discredited. By 
76. Report para 1.3. 
77. Report para 1.10. 
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identifying local calls for an investigation into rape-
related issues with feminist activities elsewhere, the 
37 






than they deserve. 
! 
tainted by/ 
association. According to this view there is no rape 
problem, only a fabrication by feminists in pursuing their 
goal of equal rights for women. Consequently, all feminist-
originated reform proposals are immediately suspect. The 
Commission maintains this position throughout the Report. 
The Commission's undisguised suspicion of the unidentified 
feminist groups is a notable feature of the Report. There 
is a marked insider/outsider (or we/they) dichotomy in its 
approach which is highly revealing. Feminist groups are 
depicted as "outsiders" whose concerns are not identifiable 
_with "ours", ie the concerns of "society" as represented by 
the Commission. "Our" concern is with good 1 aw ref or·m, 
while "their" concern is to improve the status of women; 78 
"we" identify real problems while "they" do not; "we" are 
objective, while "they" are biased. 7 "' The Commission./ 
strongly implies that the feminist concern about rape was( 
(and still is) simply part of a strategy to achieve another,? 
unrelated aim, viz an improvement in the status of women.s~J 
78. Report para 2.3. 
79. Report para 1.10. 





Note the Commission's choice of language in the following 
extract on efforts made in America to re-define the crime: 
"Feminists made use of the current national 
preoccupation with crime control to induce 
legislators, prosecutors, and the police (who 
could not be motivated to law reform by the need 
for the realization of feminist values) to 
introduce reform. The latter allowed themselves 
to be influenced by this, and the result was 
radical reforms of the law relating to rape. The 
feminists were not so much concerned with law 
reform on the grounds of real and identified 
needs, as with a mighty and symbolic means to 
obtain equal r·ights for women. 11611 
The language is suggestive of a conspiracy which managed to 
trick the legislators into feminist-oriented reform. As the 
Commission has already accepted that the reform has been 
disappointing in •its results, 612 the implication is clearly 
made that the whole process was an unfortunate mistake from 
which "we" should learn. 
The Commission here denies a link between rape and the wider 
society, which it recognised in a previous paragraph, 613 and 
suggests that the struggle for equal rights for women is 
incompatible with good law reform. 
The Commission has clearly misunderstood the feminist 
position. The feminist aim is without doubt an egalitarian 
society in which women and men have substantive, not merely 
formal, equality. Feminists are concerned to identify real 
81. Report para 2.3 (underlining added). 
82. F~epor·t para 1. 11. 
Cl":f Report 1. 7" . .'·.'• para 
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barriers to this equality and, to this end, have focused on 
several issues such as marriage, family structure, child 
care, equal Job opportunities and th~ role of the state and 
the law in the maintenance of the status quo. The Report 
correctly points out that rape occupies a special position 
on the feminist agenda. This is because, from the feminist 
perspective, rape 1 i es at 
destructive gender relations. 
the heart of _une9~al and 
On one level, rape is a 
symbol of entrenched cultural sexism and has galvanised 
feminist energies. But that does not mean, as the 
Commission apparently believes, that rape is not a real 
problem. In feminist terms it is a form of violence ~g~~~st 
women which has _very real consequen':~5:-~Clr __ women. 
Feminists are depicted as outside society both 
geographically (these are mainly foreign feminist groups) 
and conceptually (they propose a radically different view of 
rape). Their ascribed status as outsiders to the consensus 
of society renders them marginal to it. The Commission, the 
mouthpiece of the consensus, reproduces the dominant view of 
feminist grou~s as outside society, ie deviant, suspect and 
not to be trusted. 
The feminist perspective, being a woman-centred perspective, 
poses a challenge to the dominant, male-centred consensus on 





Nihilation is a conceptual 
reality of phenomena or 
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interpretations which do not fit into the dominant·symbolic 
universe. 84 The threat to the dominant social definition of 
reality, viz the deviant phenomena of feminist groups 
proposing an alternative reality, is neutralised by 
assigning to it an inferior or negative ontological 
status. 61:5 The feminist perspective thereby acquires the 
status of a marginal phenomenon, not to be taken seriously. 
Thus the potential threat which it poses is conceptually 
liquidated. 
The Commission however, goes further than conceptual 
nihilation of the feminist perspective. It attempts to 
incorporate this deviant conception within its own symbolic 
universe, ie a male-centred, patriarchal universe. The 
feminiit groups are perceived as biased towards their own 
cause, as unscrupulous strategists who use the law for their 
own ends, as dishonest in their criticisms of rape law and 
as mistaken in their attempts to change it. The Commission 
implies that if only they would be more objective (like 
"us") and more honest <like "us") they would realize their 
mistake and abandon their stand. This would bring them back 
into the consensus and they would share "our" symbolic 
universe. In this way, the potential threat to the dominant 
84. Berger and Luckmann supra n65, 132. 
8~ Berger and Luckmann supra n65, 132. 
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patriarchal reality is subtly converted into an affirmation 
Of it ■ El6. 
( i i i ) The third indication that the Commission does not 
recognise the existence of a real problem worthy of 
investigation is the following: 
"Many of the problems which the victim allegedly 
experiences at present are probably an inevitable 
result of our ad~ersary system, and proposals to 
solve these problems should not lose sight of the 
possibility of prejudice to the accused."e7 
This statement, which appears under the heading starting-
point of the investigation, does not augur well for the 
investigation. At·the same time the reader is cautioned as 
to the competition between the victim's alleged problems and 
the accused's rights. The former are regarded at most as an 
unfortunate spin-off of the adversarial system. It is 
submitted that the Commission's lack of clarity as to the 
existence and nature of the problems of the victim leads it 
to confound this matter with the issue of the adversarial 
form of criminal justice. These issues are related but not 
identical. For example, from the victim's point of view, it 
is not simply the possibility of an insensitive, probing 
cross-examination of her sexual history that is problematic, 
but the existence of the rule which defines such information 
41 
as legally relevant in the first place. 
'/ 
The rules of,✓ 
86. See the discussion by Berger and Luckmann supra n65, 
132. 
P7. Pe□ ort para 1.9. See also para 4.64. 
procedure and evidence are weighted against the complainant 
in that they impose special requirements on her and render 
her vulnerable to attack on her moral character.es The law 
encourages the examination of the complainant's sexual 
behaviour in deciding the issue of her consent to the act in 
question while protecting the accused from similar inquiry. 
Thus it is the law itself and not the adversarial method of 
... -- . -•-·· .... -· -· -· .. 
criminal justice which is the basis of the complainant's 
.. - - - .. - . ·- - . - ·-- -
prob!~ms in respect of the processing of the case. \While an 
·-
aggressive cross-examination can undoubtedly add to her 
trauma, it is not the real problem to be dealt with, as 
identified above. An inquisitorial system of criminal 
justice which allows for judicial scrutiny and assessment of 
the complainant's sexual morality could still traumatise the 
complainant. 
The Commission's construction of the issue as a problem of 
the adversary nature of our criminal process is therefore a 
distortion. It reduces the issue to that of a simple 
competition between the rights of the accused and those of 
the victim. In one respect the Commission is correct: a 
defended trial in an adversarial system is a form of 
competition. The prosecution and the defence present 
differing constructions of the event in question. Though 
they may agree on a number of facts (which then become 
common cause), they present to the court competing 
PP See ss197 and 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
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constructions of the reality of the event, ie of the truth. 
The construction accepted by the court becomes the 
established "truth" for all purposes. The court's r·ejection 
of the complainant's version leads to the accused's 
acquittal, even though the court may not necessarily accept 
his version. In any event the rules that regulate the 
····- -- .. --• .. -·-· .. ----·· -- . ···-·· 
It is submitted that the Commission's mistake lies in its 
assumption that the participants begin the process from a 
footing of equality and therefore that a proposal to 
i mpr::ove the ~osition of• the complainant threatens to 
disadvantage the position of the accused. Hence, before it 
considers the proposals, the Commission immediately 
counterposes this suggestion with the caveat of the 
potential danger to the rights of the accused. By means of 
a plea to the rights of the accused, it secures a balance of 
sympathy in his favour. It is argued here that the 
strengthening of the complainant's 
the weakeriing 
position does not 
of the accused's 
~~sition, as the Commission implies.•• The Report suggests 
that the rights of the accused in the adversary system are 
superior to those of the victim and enjoy priority. This is 
one way of blotting out claims to improve the position of 
the complainant. Safeguarding the rights of an accused 
89. Report para 3.7. 
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should be a major concern of any criminal justice system but 
it is not the only interest to be taken into account. The 





fair trial, ie an equitable 
or innocence. 
\ 
The concept of/ 
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fairness, however, does not 
complainant at a disadvantage 
include 
in the 
the placing of the
1
j' 
prosecution of the 
case. 
\ 
It is submitted that the rules of procedure and) 
evidence, which place a special burden on the complainant, 
do precisely this. 
\ 
The abolition of these rules would/ 
remove the disadvantage to the victim's position without) 
prejudicing the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
(iv> The fact that the Commission received a limited 
response to its questionnaire made it wonder ''whether there 
really is so much dissatisfaction in South Africa with the 
law relating to rape as is generally made out by the 
press". 9121 
This negative view is based on a perceived causal link 
between the limited response and the existence of the posed 
research problem. Only two points need be made: first, 
what constitutes a "relatively limited response"? According 
to the Report 91 the questionnaire was sent to 223 interested 
parties and was open for public comment. One hundred and 
sixteen interested parties and one hundred and five members 
90. Report para 1.13. 
91. Report para 1.13 and p192. 
of the public responded. From the Report it is impossible 
to gauge the quality and extent of the comments received, so 
the reader is obliged to rely on the Commission's evaluation 
of the response as limited. One is hard pressed, however, 
to avoid the impression, in the light of the Commission's 
negative and pessimistic view, that only an overwhelmingly 
positive and vociferous response (but probably not from 
feminists) would convince it that a problem exists. It 
obviously requires convincing. The Commission's evaluation 
of the response as "weak" must, in the absence of further 
information, be viewed in this light. 
The second point is the Commission's belief that because of 
the limited response there is probably no real problem. 
This cannot pass without scrutiny. It misses the obvious 
point that rape victims do not have a high social visibility 
and that rape is not a public controversy. The Commission 
attaches insufficient weight to the hidden nature of the 
crime and the victim. Rape victims do not often speak 
publicly of their experience. Thus a high public awareness 
of the victim's prpblems ~annot be expected and it is 
probable that the "limited response" is partly a reflection 
'.;.,..,t.,~ 
of the invisibility of the crime and of the victim. 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
The Report is marred by two major methodological weaknesses, 
both relating to data sources. 
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(i) Dependence upon institutionalised authority 
The Commission has relied on institutionalised authorities 
as a major data source. The information-gathering process 
for the Report was accomplished by way of a general 
invitation to the public to submit comment, a questionnaire 
sent to 223 "interested parties", discussions with 
representatives of agencies with a professional interest in 
rape-related issues, a closed seminar attended mainly by 
such representatives and the Commission's own research into 
law reform.• 2 
The Commission placed great reliance on the questionnaire 
responses. In its own words: 
"Comments on this questionnaire 
define controversial issues and 
subjects for investigation, and 
determine the need for reform and 
for reform ...• 11 • 3 
were used to 
to single out 
have helped to 
the alternatives 
In other words, the Commission has allowed the collective 
response to decide whether victim-related problems exist, 
what they are and how they should be solved. Responses were 
received from various bodies, such as churches, welfare 
,organisations, women's organisations and academics. Not 
surprisingly, almost half of the responses received 
<according to the table in the Report> emanated from law 
enforcement officials and state bodies: judges, regional 
and district magistrate,, Attorneys-General, senior public 
_l/-: 
92. Report paras 1.13, 1.14 and 1.15. 
93. Report para 1.13. 
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prosecutors, law societies, the General Council of the Bar 
of South Africa, the State Attorney, government departments 
and administration boards.q 4 Similarly, the overwhelming 
majority of parties with whom consultations were held were 
state officials: 8 Attorneys-General or their deputies; 12 
regional magistrates; 36 district magistrates; 3 public 
prosecutors; 10 members of the South African Police; 7 
district surgeons; 4 provincial hospital officers; 
officers of various state departments; ll!l rape c r i s i s 
representatives and one expert on forensic medicine. Most 
of these people were men.~~ 
The questionriaire itself and a summary of responses do not 
appear in the Report. Nor is the reader able to assess, 
purely from the lists of contributors, the quality and 
extent of the contribution of the various participants. 
However, on a purely quantitative evaluation, it is clear 
that the Commission has relied mainly on state-supported 
sources for its data, viz agents in the criminal justice 
system. They, however, could not agree on where the 
problems lay: 
"Because of the divergent nature of the 
involvement of those concerned and their 
conviction that othe~ disciplines than their own 
were really responsJb,le for the victim's trauma 
there was clearly a need for them to be confronted 
with one another's views, problems and suggested 
solutions and to be able to contribute in joint 
discussions to the formulation of tentative 
94. Report p 192. 




orgc.-1.nized ...• " 9 "' 
A closed seminar was therefore 
It is implied that if only the criminal justice personnel 
can get together and exchange views and criticisms, the 
problems will somehow be ironed out. This increase in 
mutual understanding between the various agencies might well 
contribute to the smoother operati6n of the criminal justice 
process, but what will it do for the victim? Her problems 
are not likely to be better understood or alleviated in this 
way. 
The Commission's over-reliance on certain sources cannot be 
ascribed to any conscious, conspiratorial bias in favour of 
state authority. On the contrary, it clearly upholds the 
notions of balance, impartiality and objectivity as research 
values, hence its aim to 







"realistically and objectively"c;,a in the light of the 
present South African law and its insistence that only an 
empirical study of rape in South Africa can provide "the 
facts".• 9 What emerges from the, Report, is the Commission's 
distinction between facts and opinions which belies its 
apparently democratic ~ethod of investigation. Its attempt 
96. Report para 1. 15. 
97. Report para 1. ll!j. 
98. Report para 1.rn1. 
99. See Report para 1. 7. 
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to get to the truth leads the Commission consistently to 
search for "the facts" from certain accredited sources and 
not from others. Thus the over-reliance of the Commission 
on the official agents of the criminal justice system stems 
from its demands of impartiality and objectivity and is 
based on a belief that these agents (whom Hal1, 1 m0 in a 
different conte:-:t, has called the "institutional spokesmen") 
have greater access to the truth due to their special 
position. Their statements are thus accepted as objectively 
true and authoritative. For example, in its discussion of 
the evidentiary rule allowing for the cross-examination of 
the complainant 
experience, the 
on her character and previous sexual 
Commission notes that only "a 
individuals" criticise this rule: 
" the crit0icism is mainly levelled by 
representatives of Rape Crisis organisation and a 
few lawyers. Some members of the public also 
strongly criticised the present position in their 
comments to the Commission. The grounds advanced 
for the criticism emanating from the latter source 
however are indicative of a probable lack of 
knowledge of the application of the law of 
evidence. Those who administer the law 
(magistrates, prosecutors and attorneys-general) 
are all agreed that there is no need far 
reform .••• 111 m 1 
few 
Th€~ operation of a "hierarchy of credibility 111 .zt 2 is evident, 
ie those who occupy powerful or high-status positions in 
100. Hall e~ al Policing the Crisis 58. 
101. Report para 3.7. See also para 3.28. 
11!12. The term is adapted fr·am Becker "Whose side are we on?" 
in JD Douglas Ced) The Relevance of Sociology 99-111. 
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society are more likely to have their views and opinions 
accepted as the truth than those in positions of low-status 
or powerlessness. The hierarchy of credibility reflects the 
distribution of power. For example, in the institutional 
hierarchy the official law enforcement agents rank above 
crisis clinics, and on the lowest rung one would find the 
person with the lowest status and the least power - the 
victim her·self. Her perceptions and views carry the least 
The image of the rape victim as a person of credibility. 
low credibility is reproduced in the law itself. 1 ~ 3 The 
representatives of the major social institutions of the 
criminal justice system are able to impose their definitions 
of the problem and thereby determine the parameters of the 
r·esearch. In this way, the Report has unwittingly 
reproduced the existing power structure in the criminal 
justice system and in the wider society. 
The discussion of the problem takes place on a certain 
hierarchical rung and mainly between those whose status-
positions are located there, viz the official agents of the 
criminal justice system. It becomes easy to see the problem 
as an "in-house" affair - something that can be effectively 
dealt with in a closed seminar. The conclusion is 
unavoidable that the Commission has turned to the sources 
from which it is least likely to obtain the data it 
103. In the evidentiary rules relating to complainants in 
sexual cases. See infra 'The Reform Proposals'. 
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requires: to those who are allegedly responsible for the 
problems of the rape victim. 
The investigation is thus reduced to an exercise in self-
criticism on the part of law enforcement officials, with the 
Commission acting as catalyst. It displays little vigorous, 
independent thought, preferring to gather and arrange the 
opinions presented to it and to crystallize some measure of 
consensus on the various topics. It does so in the rather 
pedestrian manner of aligning all arguments for reform 
against the arguments opposing reform and then arriving at a 
conclusion and recommendation which accords with the 
majority view. Not surprisingly, it recommends few changes 
to the present law. The possibility is never raised that 
the criminal justice system itself (and, more specifically, 
the fact that it is operated and controlled by middle-class, 
male bureaucrat, ~ho cannot or will not share the victim's ·--
perspective) might be part of the problem. 
(ii) The absence of the victim 
In contradistinction to its over-reliance on institutional 
sources, the Commission's Report ignor~s completely the rape 
~ 
victims as a source of information. They are excluded from 
the investigation with the following glib dismissal: 
''No evidence was sought from victims themselves in 
order to establish whether they had really 
experienced the high degree of trauma due to the 
process of law that is generally alleged by 
criminologists, sociologists, women's 
organizations, crisis services and the press 
because the Commission does not have personnel 
trained for this type of investigation. 111 1Z1 4 
This is the only reason put forward by the Commission. It 
is contended here that in a Report entitled Women and Sexual 
Offences in South Africa which explicitly adopts the victim 
as the starting-point, the victim as a source of 
information would be acknowledged as crucial to the whole 
enterprise. The omission of this source endangers the 
credibility of the Report and requires a greater 
justification than is offered. The Commission apparently 
disagrees with this proposition, as it offers no further 
justification nor does it display any hesitancy regarding 
the validity of its findings. In addition, it must be 
pointed out that in terms of the South African Law 
Commission Act, 1 1Z1~ the Commission is granted the power to 
person or body in the process of its consult any 
investigation. The Commission may employ "any person with 
special knowledge of any matter relating to the work of the 
Commission, or obtain fhe co-operation of any body, to 
advise or assist the Commission in the performance of its 
fun't..:\:ions" under the Act. :1.1Z1• ·,. The conclusion is unescapable 
that the Commission has chosen not to make use of its 
powers. 
104. Report para 1.17. 
105. Act 19 of 1973. 
106. Sections 5(3) and 8(2) of the Act. 
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Two questions, however, must be posed: 
(a) What assumptions led the Commission to believe that it 
could omit the rape victim from the inquiry without 
endangering the credibility of the Report? 
(b) What is the significance and implication of the absence 
of the victim from the Report? 
As regards the first question, it appears that the 
Commission accepts without question that the institutional 
authorities are competent to provide knowledge and insight 
into the problems experienced by the rape victim. There is 
no perceived need to approach the victim because the 
Commission <and the authorities themselves) assume that they 
can speak on her behalf and that thei~ pronouncements will 
be authoritative. 
The assumption that men~~ 7 can produce authoritative 
knowledge about women is deeply embedded in patriarchal 
society and reflects the social and moral authority accorded 
to the powerful group. The generation of such knowledge as 
a matter of public record is itself a function of social 
power. This militates against the production of knowledge 
generated by women themselves which, in the feminist 
experience, is significantly at variance with knowledge 
produced by men. 
107. As noted supra n95, the majority of those consulted by 
the Commission were men. 
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As regards the second question posed, it is evident that the 
absence of the rape victim constitutes a major defect in the 
Report. The victim and her point of view are relegated to 
the status of non-data. 1 ~ 8 Her independant ability to know 
is denied and is subsumed under the ability of the 
institutional authorities to know on her behalf. The Report 
thus represents an instance of men producing knowledge about 
women: in this case, raped women and their problems. Their 
credentials as producers of knowledge are accepted as 
impeccable; no-one questions their ability to know. This is 
because the power to produce knowledge ihcludes the power to 
define that which constitutes data and that which 
constitutes non-data. 1 ~~ There is an inverse proportion 
between the degree to which the Commission has relied on its 
sources and the ability of these sources to "know" about the 
problems of the rape victims and a direct proportion between 
reliance on the sources and their vested interest in 
maintaining the present sexual and legal status quo. Under 
guise of objectivity, the Report is able to pursue an anti-
feminist bias which is all the more remarkable for its 
occasional transparency. This bias reveals the central 
contradiction in the Report: the Commission rejects what it 
108. Daly Beyond God the Father: Towards a Philosophy of 
Women's Liberation 11. 
109. As Daly notes, women have historically been classified 
as non-data: absent from history and invisible in the 
world. Daly supra n108, 7. 
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perceives as feminist values 11 ~ but claims that the victim 
is the starting-point of its inquiry. 111 The victim as the 
starting-point is the essence of the feminist perspective. 
This perspective takes women's experience as its reference 
point and it attempts to describe the world from the 
standpoint of women. Although the Commission has undermined 
its stated position, ie the victim as the starting point, by 
the research method it follows, it is clear that the 
Commission believes that it has reproduced reality from the 
point of view of the victim. The Commission thereby 
validates the very position it explicitly rejects. 
3. THE AIMS AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE INVESTIGATION 
A notable feature of the Report is the total absence of 
stated policy considerations and guiding principles. The 
investigation is placed in a social and political vacuum 
where "common sense" is presumably the key guide to 
reform. 112 The lack of c6nceptual framework in which to 
understand the central research problem and to situate 
consequent recommendations is a serious flaw. Some 
articulation of the main considerations or the criteria used 
110. See Report paras 1.3, 1.10 and 2.3 where the Commission 
explicitly distances its position from that of 
"feminists". 
ii 111. Report paras 1. 9 and 2. 19. 
112. On the importance of "common sense" as a site on which 
the dominant ideology is constructed and challenged, 
see Gramsci Selections from the Prison Notebooks 323-
343 and 419-425. 
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in the formulation of reform proposals would have sharpened 
the considerably diffused and confused focus of the Report 
and increased its internal coherence. 
The Commission might well have followed the example of the 
Law Report Commission of Canada which, in its report on 
Sexual Offences, 113 stated three cardinal reasons why it 
believed the Canadian law of sexual offences was in need of 
reform and selected three fundamental principles on which to 
base reform: 
(i) protection of the person; 
(ii) protection of children and special groups; 
(iii) safeguarding public decency. 11 ~ 
The insight, clarity of purpose and vigour with which the 
Canadian Law Reform Commission approached its task stands in 
stark contrast with the approach of its South African 
counterpart. One may or may not agree with the selection of 
guiding principles but they make the report more 
intelligible and amenable to critical discussion. 
4. THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF LAW REFORM 
How then does the Commission view its task? What does it 
hope to accomplish? Very little, it seems. 
113. Of 1978. 
114. Report Chapter 1. 
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This view is based on a belief that reform of rape laws in 
other jurisdictions has been disappointing in its 
achievements. Reform represents merely a "symbolic victory 
in the struggle for equal rights of women, rather than an 
actual solution of e:dsting legal problems". 1:1.e Legal 
reform elsewhere, in the Commission's view, has not 
accomplished much and ''CiJt would be short-sighted not to 
learn , from this evaluation". 11 "' It is not explained 
precisely why the reader is asked to engage in cross-
cultural comparison on this point, when the Commission 
rejects its relevance on others. The "symbolic:" results of 
reform accomplished elsewhere are stated to be the promotion 
of "a greater awareness of the crime and a change in 
attitude towards the crime, the victim and the rapist, and 
recognition of the sexual autonomy of women''. 117 Why these 
real gains are relegated to the realm of the symbolic is not 
clear. If legal reform can indeed accomplish all this, then 
the first small steps towards genuine social change in rape-
related matters will have been taken. 
While it would be foolish to expect social problems to be 
eradicated with a stroke of the legislative pen, it appears 
that the Commission underplays the potential of reform and 
has low expectations of what can be achieved. It implies 
115. Repor·t para 1. 112!. 
116. Report para 1. 11!!. 
117. Report para 1.11. 
.. • '-'='li11 
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that because legal reform cannot eradicate rape, "it would 
be more realistic to expect minor changes in the attitude 
towards the victim''. 118 If that is the most one can expect 
from reform, the whole enterprise seems rather hopeless. 
The Commission from the outset has an almost defeatist 
attitude to its task. The short-sighted, pseudo realism of 
the Report constitutes more of a stumbling block than a 
clear perspective on the potential of legal reform. Its 
view is reducible to the proposition that, as rape is a 
social problem, there is little to expect from legal reform. 
But the Commission has overlooked the possibility that the 
law itself forms part of this social problem. The problem 
consists of not only the occurrence of widespread, 
undetected and tolerated acts of rape but also of the law's 
unwitting contribution to their perpetuation: the selective 
application of the criminal justice process and the content 
of the law itself. From a feminist perspective it is 
imperative that this contribution be recognised and dealt 
with effectively. Many of the social and male-biased 
beliefs about female human nature and rape are encoded into 
the substantive and procedural law. The law helps to 
reproduce them as "knowledge", the effect of which is to 
hinder the reporting and successful prosecution of rape 
cases. Legal reform cannot totally eradicate the occurrence 
118. Report para 1.11. 
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of rape but it can surely attempt to deal with the law's 
contribution to the problem. 
The reform of rape law in other jurisdictions has not proved 
to be as worthless an exercise as the Commission suggests. 
In a careful study of reform in Washington, Loh 11 • found 
that the positive effects of the new rape law12~ were the 
following: 
Ci) A more precise labelling of the act, ie acts which, 
under the old law, would have been charged as 
assault, are dealt with as rape in terms of the new 
law. 
(ii) As the reform proponents had hoped, the gradation of 
(ii i ) 
rape has. enhanced considerably the negotiating 
flexibility of prosecutors. 
The punishment for convicted offenders has become 
more certain even though it is less harsh. Judges 
are stricter in sentencing and impose suspended 
sentences only one third as often as under the old 
119. Loh "What has Reform of Rape Legislation Wrought?" 1981 
37 (4) Journal of Social Issues 28-52. See also Loh 
"The Impact of Common Law and Rape Reform Statutes on 
F'rosecL1tion: An Empirical Case Study" 1981!! 55(3) 
Washington Law Review 543-625. 
12121. The law divides rape into three .degrees according to 
the extent of force or threat used: first degree rape 
is forcible intercourse under aggravated circumstances; 
second degree rape requires intercourse under 
compulsion; third degree rape .is intercourse without 
consent or with threat of substantial harm to property 
rights. 
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common law. The commitment to in-patient sexual 
offender treatment facilities has more than doubled. 
According to general deterrence theory, it is the 
certainty of adequate <though not overly harsh) 
punishment which should result in a lower incidence 
of the crime. 
Loh found, however, that reform has not affected the 
proportion of cases charged or declined, nor the proportion 
of convicted cases. This indicates that, regardless of the 
governing law, prosecutors use the same criteria to decide 
whether or not to charge and what offence to charge. The 
author concludes that the main impact of the reform has been 
an educative one for society at large rather than an 
instrumental one for law enforcement. The reform law has 
created a climate for change in the criminal justice system 
--
that encourages the enforcement of rape laws as a top 
administrative priority: 
"The role of the reform of rape law as a catalyst 
for attitude change may be greater than any 
immediate impact on the criminal justice system. 
The criminal law serves not only a general 
deterrent function. It also has a moral or 
'sociopedagogic' purpose to reflect and shape 
moral values and beliefs of society." 121 
It is submitted that the Commission under-rates the 
importance of attitude change as an aim of law reform. It 
bases its negative evaluation of reform in other 
jurisdictions on its opinion (which is also open to 
121 . Loh SUQL.s n 119, 51!1. 
challenge) that reform has not had much impact on the 
instrumental function of the law (actual law enforcement); 
all it has been able to achieve is a change in social 
attitudes towards the crime and the victim. The Commission 
thus views the educative function of law as secondary in 
importance; changing 
achievement. 
attitudes is seen as a 1 esser 
It is argued here that the contrary is true: that in the 
reform of rape law the educative function of law is of 
primary importance. Changing attitudes towards the victim 
is a major task and a necessary precondition for· more 
effective. law enforcement. Reformed rape law into which is 
encoded a different image of the victim and which extends 
more control over the decisions and behaviour of the 
criminal justice agents would help to create a climate in 
which further ch~ge can occur. Legilative reform is a 
necessary prerequisite for change but it is not per se 
sufficient. There must also be a firm commitment to 
effective enforcement by those who operate the criminal 
justice system. As the Commission is aware, more effective 
rape law enforcement necessitates a change in their 
attitudes towards the crime and the victim. For the process 
of reform to begin they will be required to play a leading 
role in the formation of new public attitudes. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the aforegoing discussion that the 
Commission is not at all certain whether a research-worthy 
problem exists. Its demarcation of the area of research 
amounts to a defining-away: It accepts that there is no 
significant under-reporting of rape. Allegations to the 
contrary and to the effect that the legal process itself 
traumatises the victim are believed to originate in feminist 
crusades to change society, not in a genuine concern for 
sound legal reform. The Commission believes it inevitable 
~ 
that the victim should be discomforted in the legal process. 
A serious defect in the Report is the. Commission's 
unresolved ambivalence as to the existence of the problem. 
It appears constantly to shift its position from a denial 
that the legal process causes any problems for the rape 
victim, to an admission that there might well be a problem, 
to an acceptance as a working assumption that there might be 
a secondary victimisation, without being sure that it exists 
in reality. 122 
In the light of the above and of its beliefs that legal 
reform can accomplish little, the question must seriously be 
raised whether the Commission has become entangled in a 
cir~ular, self-fulfilling formula in which its 
presuppositions contain its conclusions. The submission 
1?7. qee for example Report paras 1.17 and 5.1. 
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made here is that it has indeed fallen into the trap of the 




THE REFORM PROPOSALS 
The Commission recommends few changes to the law or the 
administrative processing of rape cases in the criminal 
justice system. The recommendation may be summarised as 
follows, in accordance with the format of the Report. 
1. SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
The Commission considers three matters under this head, viz 
the definition of the crime of rape, marital rape and the 
irrebuttal presumption that a boy under the age of 14 years 
cannot be guilty of rape. 
(i) Redefinition of the Crime 
The Commission rejects a proposal to redefine the crime of 
rape. 1 The following eight reasons for this rejection 
emerge from the Report: 
\ 
(a) the impetus for this reform is identified as feminist-
inspired and therefore to be treated with suspicion. 2 
Objections to the present definition were received 
almost exclusively from representatives of Rape Crisis 
and certain women's organisations. 3 
1. Report para 2.21. 
2. See supra 36-41. 
3. Report para 2.3. 
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(b) There were no proponents of redefinition among the 
"interested persons" ,-iho responded to the Cammi ssi on' s 
questionnaire or with whom discussions were held. 4 At 
the closed seminar it became evident to the Commission 
that there is at present no· need to redefine the 
crime.e; 
(c) A redefinition of the crime along the lines proposed, 
ie viewing rape primarily as an assault, would, by its 
emphasis on violence, be a retrogressive step. It 
would constitute a restriction on the legal protection 
enjoyed by women at present. 6 
(d) A shift in emphasis to the violent nature of the act of 
rape would not circumvent another of the objections to 
the current definition, viz the emphasis on the 
I 
victim's consent. This is because, in the Commission's 
view, rape and assault are fundamentally different: 
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"The essential element of rape is se:-:ual intercourse 
without consent while the essential element of assault 
is the application of violence without consent". 7 
(e) A single criminal category dealing with sexual crimes 
might lead to legal uncertainty and in consequence is 
4. Report para 2. 12. 
5. Report pa.ra 2. 12. 
6. Report para 2.13. 
7. Report para 2. 15. 
I 
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undesirable. The Commission accepts that rape is a 
"distinct se:<ual 
from "unnatural 
crime" ~-ihich must be distinguished 
se:-:ual intercourse", because the 
interests protected in each case are different.a 
(f) Prosecutors would be confused if rape were redefined as 
(g) 
a species of assault, graded according to the 
seriousness of the attack.• 
E:-:per i ence in 
redefinition of 
other jurisdictions shows that the 
rape is mainly of "symbolic" 
significance. 1 w 
Ch) Changing the name of the crime from rape to assault 
does not change the law of evidence: the same evidence 
must be given in each case. Since the starting point 
for the/ investigation is the alleviation of victim 
trauma, any such change will do nothing to improve the 
position of the victim. 11 
These factors are inadequate reasons for rejecting a 
redefinition of the crime. The Commission's treatment of 
the issue is marked, by bias and a certain amount of 
c·onfusion. It has a clear anti-feminist stance (which was 
noted earlier). The Commission advances as one of its 
8. Report para 2. 16. ( 
9. Report para 2. 17. 
11!1. Report para 2. 18. 
11.. Report para 2. 2t!5. 
/ 
reasons for rejecting a redefinition the fact that none of 
the interested parties who responded to the questionnaire or 
with whom discussions were held, were in favour of it. But 
the Commission has ignored the views of representatives of 
Rape Crisis and certain women's organisations which were in 
favour of redefinition. From the Report 12 it is evident that 
Rape Crisis and 24 women's organisations commented on the 
questionnaire, that 10 Rape Crisis representatives took part 
in the discussions 13 and that four representatives attended 
the closed seminar. It seems that the Commission's 
de·f i ni ti on of 11 interested par·ti es II e:<cl udes these groups. 
The Report gives no justification for this. 
In addition, the Commission has allowed the collective 
opinion of the "invested parties" to form its own conclusion 
(see (b) supra) that there is no need to redefine the crime 
of rape. With respect, it is trite that the existence of 
the need is an issue which the Commission itself must 
decide. It cannot evade this issue by accepting the opinion 
of certain parties as conclusive. 
I 
The Commission reveals considerable conceptual confusion in 
respect of the merits of an alternative definition of rape. 
It. does not see the need for redefinition because it accepts 
; 
vJi. thout question that 
( 
really is what the law proclaims rape 
it to be (see Cd) sugra>, that r·ape and assault l a,,Js dea.l 
12. Report p 197-200. 
13. Report p 197-200. 
/ 
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with qualitatively different behaviour and that the 
interests which are protected in each case are essentially 
different. 
challenge. 14 
All of these notions are open to serious 
However, the Commission is precluded from a 
critical inquiry by its inability to break the conceptual 
grip of the law of rape on its thinking about the problem. 
Its reasoning therefore becomes circular. 1 ~ It is not able 
to reconceptualise rape as a form of assault and discuss the 
merits of such an alternative concept. It thus tends 
towards confusing reconceptualisation with simple re-naming 
of the offence <see <h> supra). The objections of confusion 
for prosecutors and the supposed symbolic significance of 
the reformed 
although new 
rape law elsewhere are both inadequate: 
laws might initially be confusing, the 
Commission under-estimates the ability of South African 
prosecutors to cope with such problems. In the light of 
th·ese allegedly real problems for the prosecution, it is 
difficult to 
I 
understand why the Commission views the 
redefinition of rape as merely "symbolic". The reference 
which it cites in support of this proposition does not, in 
fact, support it: 
"The new rape law symbolizes and reinforces newly 
emerging conceptions about the status of women and 
the right of self-determination in sexual 
conduct. 111 <&. 
14. See Hal 1 "Rape: The Politics of Definition" 
(unpublished paper 1987). 
15. See al so Repor·t para 2. yt.. 
16. Report para 2.18. 
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The paint here is that the "old" rape law, ie the Angla-
American common law definition of rape, both reflects and 
reinforces an inferior status far women. Its underlying 
values and the interests it protected were (and are) 
inimical ta women's interests. 17 Just as the old law stood 
as a symbol of an old orde~ of sexual inequality, so the 
reform of rape law (largely as a result of feminist activism 
as the Commission paints out), stands as a symbol of an 
altered conception of the status of wa~en. It is a highly 
significant event that women, who have traditionally been 
excluded from the law-making process, were able to lobby 
j 
successfully far the introduction of a law which reflects 
and attempts ta protect their interests. The new law thus 
stands as a symbol or index of a change in women's status 
and social power. This does not mean, however, that the 
content of the law is also symbolic. Redefining rape in 
ter·ms of assault involves a reconc~pt ion of the nature of 
the act and consequent changes in the processing of rape 
cases. That this innovation should encounter initial 
practical difficulties and uncertainties is hardly 
surprising, but it cannot constitute a fatal abjection to 
redefinition. 
The last reason why the Commission recommends that the crime 
/ 
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not be redefined relates to the aims of the investigation.· 
The Commission admits that the investigation did not arise 
1
..., 
I • See Hall supra n14. 
out of a need to rationalise the criminal law, nor did 
consideration of the substantive law fall within its 
brief. 19 Nevertheless it decided to investigate this matter 
"because objections are often raised against the definition 
of rape by certain interested parties in conjunction with 
representations for the reform of the law relating ta 
rape". 1 • In its final opinion, however-, the Commission 
accords more weight ta the arguments against reform 
"especially since the starting-point of this investigation 
is the alleviation of victim trauma". 2121 It is difficult to 
follow the logic in this ar·gument. The Commission 
deliberately included in its research a topic which fell 
outside of its brief and which it believes was not necessary 
for the investigation, yet it makes a recommendation on this 
matter on the basis of its irrelevance to the aim of the 
inquiry! If the Commission is of the opinion that the issue 
of redefinition 
investigation then 
pronounce upon it. 
is not relevant to the aim of its 
it should decline to consider or 
On the other hand, if it does consider 
the matter, it cannot logically base its recommendation on 
the tangential relevance of the topic to its particular 
purpose. 
/ 
18. Report para 2.1. 
19. Report para 2.1. 
20. Report para 2.19. 
(ii) Rape in Marriage 
The Commission recommends that the marital rape exemption be 
abolished but that prosecutions should not be permitted 
without the permission of the Attorney-General. 21 
The process by which the Commission arrives at this 
recommendation is typical of the process which it adopts 
throughout the investigation. After a short statement of 
the current law (or administrative practice, in Chapter 5), 
the Report lists the arguments advanced for reform and the 
proposed alternatives. Then it lists the arguments against 
reform and, lastly, comes to a conclusion and 
recommendation. Superficially, this process appears to be a 
sound one. But, in fact, the Commission arrives at its 
conclusion and recommendations by adopting the view of the 
majority of 
authoritative. 
those informants whom it regards as 
The paragraphs of the Report in which the marital rape 
exemption is discussed are illustrative of this method. The 
Commission/notes that this topic proved to be highly 
controversial. In its investigation it became clear that 
opposing views on the topic were almost equally divided. 22 
21. Report para 2.43. 
22. In the Commission's seminar the matter was put to the 
vote. There was an almost equal split of opinion 
, between those in favour of the exemption and those 
against it (Report para 2.22). See ~lso Report paras 
2.41 and 2.42. 
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After considering all the arguments, the Commission 
indicates its own preference for the abolition of the 
e:-:empti on. The arguments are so weighty that, in its 
opinion, abolition of the rule seems to be the obvious and 
only acceptable solution. 23 Yet it declines to adopt this 
solution because it feels bound to take the opposing view 
into account: 
" •.. it is not a question o·f a 
is opposed to such reform: the 
large group of lawyers and 
cannot simply be ignored." 24 
minority group that 
views of an equally 
interested persons 
These views are to the effect that the exemption cannot be 
abolished without tampering with the institution of 
marriage, as it is generally accepted. 2 ~ The Commission 
) 
shrinks from adopting a simple, logical conclusion which it 
openly endorses because of its wish to accommodate opposing 
views. It therefore adopts a compromise solution of 
recommending the abolition of the exemption but allowing 
prosecution only with the Attorney-General's permission. In 
this instance there was no clear majority opinion. The 
Commission's compromise solution is an attempt to take two 
opposing vi,ws into account. 
The intended effect of this compromise is not clear. On the 
one hand it appears to grant to the Attorney-General no 
\ 
23. Report paras 2.42 and 2.43. 
~4. Report para 2.42. 
'":IC" 
..:..J. Report para 2.42. 
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greater power than he already has. In terms of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 2 • the decision of whether to prosecute any 
criminal case rests with the Attorney-General of the 
relevant provincial division. In this respect he exercises 
a wide discretion and is subject only to the Minister of 
Justice. 27 It is arguable, therefore that the 
recommendation merely restates the already existing legal 
position and the qualification was included mainly to allay 
fears of the more conservative opinion. If that is so, the 
qualification that no prosecutions for marital rape be 
instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General 
introduce); no change in the 1 aw. 
reform it is without import. 
As a recommendation for 
On the other hand, it is arguable that the recommendation is 
intended to be more than a restatement of the current legal 
position. It is submitted that the qualification represents 
a retreat by the Commission from its contention that the 
marital rape exemption should be abolished. The Report 
itself supports this view. The Commission has advanced 
three explicit justifications for requiring the Attorney-
General's permission: to mitigate the drastic change in the 
legal position; to prevent unfounded charges coming before 
the courts and to prevent the possibility of a 
26. Act 51 of 1977. 
27. Section 3(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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reconciliation being jeopardized by court proceedings. 28 
Secondly, the Commission includes in its proposed bill a 
section specifically making prosecution subject to the 
Attorney-General's consent. 2 • These factors indicate that 
the Commission contemplates different treatment for cases of 
marital rape, ie that the Attorney-General should exercise 
his discretion to prosecute in a manner differently from 
other criminal cases. The Report does not indicate how the 
Attorney-General is to reach his decision or whether he is 
obliged to issue a nolle prosegui when he declines to 
prosecute, in order that a private prosecution may take 
place.~~ 
It is argued here that the compromise solution is 
unsatisfactory. The Commission's recommendation does not 
confront the issue of the rights of married women to bodily 
integrity and equal protection under the law. In terms of 
the recommendation, do married women acquire the right to 
refuse sexual intercourse with their husbands? In theory, 
they do, but this right is rendered potentially nugatory by 
the qualification imposed. With respect, there is little to 
be gained in granting wives this substantive right while 
making the exercise of the right dfpendant on the consent of 
a third party who is not obliged to furnish reasons for his 
28. Report para 2.43. 
29. Article 2(2) of the bill. See Report p 179. 
30. In terms □f s7 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
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decision and who acts subject only to the Minister of 
.Ju.st.ice. The justifications advanced for the qualification 
are insubstantial: the fear of a large number of false 
charges being brought before the courts has proved to be 
groundless in those jurisdictions which have abolished the 
e:<empt.icm. It seems that relatively few wives are prepared 
to lay a rape charge against their husbands,~ 1 an indication 
which contradicts the myth of the vindictive wife underlying 
the Commission's justification. 32 Similarly, the objection 
that reconciliation may be jeopardized by court action is 
best dealt with by allowing the complainant to withdraw if 
she so wishes,~~ and not by the independent action of the 
Attorney-General. While it is readily conceded that sound 
law should not seek to encourage the break-up of families, 
it should give the raped wife the discretion whether to 
31. See Sal lman and Chappell. "Rape Law Re·form in South 
Au~.;;tral i a" Adelaide Law Review Research Paper No 3, 36--
39; Geis "Rape·-·in-Marriage: Law and Law Reform in 
England, the United States and Sweden'' 1978 6 Adelaide 
Law Review 284-288; Barshis "The Question of Marital 
Rape'' 1983 6 Women's Studies International Forum 383-
39::-:1, 38 17. 
32. This illustrates the point made supra 30 that social 
myths may continue to survive despite factual evidence 
to th€:'.' contrary. 
33. The law could possibly stipulate a cooling off period 
between the laying of the charge (and the gathering of 
the evidence) and the actual prosecution, in which 
reconciliation may be reached if this is possible. 
. ......... 
, 
preserve her physical integrity or the integrity of the 
f .:ami l y unit. ::5 4 
It is contended here that the basis of the objection to 
abolishing the marital rape exemption is resistance to the 
idea that II i t. l• r• ::, dreadful for a husband to rape 
his wife that he should be called a criminal for doing 
it II• ~.'!t5 Such resistance was expressed to the Commission by 
lawyers and interested persons" at its 
In a highly revealing paragraph of the Report, the 
Commission notes that this group put forward the following 
"This C:si.cJ husband and his wi·fe have probably 
often had sexual intercour~e with each other 
before and because there is often a measure of 
compromise in a sexual relationship, the wife may 
already in the past have consented unwillingly 
[sic] to sexual intercourse. If her husband 
forces her in the said circumstances to have 
sexual intercourse with him, the element of 
'sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent' is technically certainly present and the 
husband's behaviour may be a sign that the 
marriage is breaking down. They argue further 
34. A view similar to that of the Commission was expressed 
in the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
Se:-:ual. Offences (198121) para 33: "Spouses t1ave 
respon$ibilities towards one another and to any 
- children there may be as well as having rights against 
each other. If a wife could invoke the law of rape in 
all circumstances in which the husband forced her to 
have sexual intercourse without her consent, the 
consequences for any children would be grave, and for 
the ,-.ii fe too.". See t\l so Morris and Turner "T,-.io 
Problems in the Law of Rape'' (1952-55) 2 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 247-263. The basis of this view 
is a plea to the wife to give priority to the family 
unit rather than to her physical integrity. 
35. Criminal Law Revision Committee Sexual Offences (1984) 
par.:i 2.64. 
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that this behaviour on the part of the husband is 
however very far removed from the ugly, loathsome, 
deplorable deed for which the death sentence can 
be imposed, and with which the term rape is 
general. 1 y assoc :i . .,:1.b'::!d. " 3 "" 
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The resistance to abolishing the exemption rests not on any 
overt wish to oppress wives but on the acceptance of the 
stereotype of "true rape" re·ferred to above. 37 This i. s 
cl.ear evidence that the stereotype or myth is adhered to by 
at least some of the officials responsible for the legal 
precessing of rape cases in South Africa. It is quite 
likely ~hat this will influence the nature of their response 
to the victim or the disposition of rape cases. It follows 
that some Attorneys-General may regularly refuse to 
prosecute cases of marital rape. It is submitted that such 
a practice would amount to an unwarranted discrimination 
against married women and, in the light of contemporary 
thinking, is unacceptable. 
( i i i ) The irrebuttable presumption that a boy under l.4 
years cannot be guilty of rape 
The Report deals with this matter very briefly. It 
recommends the abolition of the presumption, mainly on the 
basis that no arguments against reform were advanced tci 
j_ t_ • ::5EI 
36. Report para 2.42. 
38. Report para 2.52. 
2. LAW OF EVIDENCE 
Under this head, the Commission considers three legal rules 
which have been strongly objected ta by critics of the 
pre~ent rape law: the rule allowing the complainant to be 
cress-examined on her previous sexual experience, the 
complaint in sexual crimes and the cautionary rule 
applicable to her evidence. Despite the criticisms advanced 
that these rules are discriminatory, unjustifiable and rest 
on sexist assumptions entrenched in the law itself, the 
Commission recommends na changes apart from a minor 
qualification. It proposes a prohibition an the cross-
questioning of the victim on her previous sexual experience 
with persons other than the accused unless an application is 
made to the presiding judicial officer in camera, stating 
the grounds for the admissibility of such questions.~q 
The Commission's discussion of this area of the law is 
notable for its lack of critical insight and its over-
reliance on certain sources for information. Regarding the 
cross-examination of the complainant on her sexual history, 
the Commission accepts as unproblematic the very issues 
which it is required to investigate. For example, it 
affirms as unproblematic that evidence of previous sexual 
intercourse between the complainant and the accused ''is 
always admissible bPcause it is directly relevant to the 
39. Report para 3.28. 
\ 
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issue of consf.mt". 412' Similcirly, it regards it <°3.S trite that 
"evid12nce cc,nc,:?rnin!J character" 41 ~,ii 11 always be relevant 
for the purposes of sentencing. 42 This view begs the 
question: it is precisely the supposed relevance of these 
issues which is in question and must be investigated. 
The operation of a hierarchy of credibility43 is evident in 
this section. The Commission discounts criticism of the law 
emanating from the public as due to probable ignorance 44 but 
accepts similar criticism from lawyers, prosecutors and 
magistrate~;. 43 On the strength of the criticisms of the 
legal profession, the Commission distinguishes between 
evidence concerning sexual intercourse with persons other 
than the accused, and evidence concerning previous sexual 
intercourse with the accused. In respect of the latter, the 
Commission accepts that such evidence is always relevant 4 ~ 
and that the law should not be altered. 47 In respect of the 
·former, however, the Commission notes that the admission of 
such evidence is prejudicial to the complainant: lawyers, 
40. Report para 3.6 (underlining added). 
41. That is, of the complainant's character. 
42. Report para 3.27. 
43. See supra 49. 
44. Rf.?port para 
45. Report para 3.26. 
46. Report para 3.25. 
47. Report para 3.29. 
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prosecutors and magistrates admitted to the Commission that 
despite the right of the court to exclude such evidence, it 
is often admitted in rape cases and ~hat the complainant's 
character is thereby unnecessarily and unfairly attacked. 49 
Although the recommendation that the admissibility of such 
evidence must be argued represents a progressive step, it is 
submitted here that the Commission once again settles for a 
half-measure of reform. It attaches insufficient weight to 
the criticism that this measure has proved to be ineffective 
in other jurisdictions because the counsel usually apply for 
and are rarely refused permission to include this 
evidence. 49 The Commission apparently believes that this 
will not occur in South African courts. It is contended 
here that such a belief is unfounded and hardly tenable in 
the light of the admission by those regularly involved in 
rape cases that this evidentiary rule is used to attack the 
complainant's character unnecessarily and unfairly.~~ As it 
appears from the Report itself the admission is that this 
48. Report para 3.26. It is arguable that a distinction 
should be drawn not between the sexual partners of the 
complainant, as the Commission has accepted, bu~ 
between evidence of prior sexual activity (with the 
accused or not) which goes to an issue in the case, and 
evidence which goes to show the complainant's 
credibility. The latter evidence should be 
inadmissible, while the former should be admissible. 
Unfortunately, the Commission does not appear to have 
considered this. 
4q Report para 3.31. See also Newby ''Rape Victims in 
Court - the Western Australian Example'' in Scutt (ed) 
Rape law Reform 115-126, 117. 
50. Report para 3.26. 
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occurs often, not exceptionally, and despite the court's 
power to prevent it. 31 This amounts to an admission that 
this practice is fairly widespread and tolerated by the 
judicial personnel and occurs II on 1 y becauf,;e. . • this; t yp€~ of 
evidenct~ is admissible". 32 In the face of widespread, 
tolerated, unfair attacks on the complainant's character, 
the possibility of regularly having such evidence included 
on application is not at all remote. There is little reason 
to believe that this will not occur. 
Although the recommendation has the merit that it would 
compel the court to consider the matter before admitting the 
evidence, it is submitted that this measure will not prove 
effective unless accompanied by a significant change in 
attitude towards the victim. 33 An evaluation of the 
operation of a similar provision in England, s2 of the 
(Amendment) Act of 1.976, has revealed that 
this measure has had little impact. The section has been 
51. Report para 3.26. 
52. Report para 3.26. 
53. Legal reforms which disturb these notions meet with 
resistance on the part of the criminal justice 
personnel. For example, Chappell and Singer Rape in 
New York City: A Study of Material in the Police Files 
and its Meaning 266, in Chappell, Geis and Geis (eds) 
246-271. report that, after the state of California 
abolished its corroboration requirement, a Los Angeles 
deputy prosecutor· ~~tc,\l.E~d: 11 LE-~g2\l t.t"H,~ory i~; not leq,;,.l 
reality ... and in California, just like anywhere else 
in the country, a woman who hopes to win a rape case 
bet t.er hav,2 p 1 t'"=nt y of corroborat. ion. 11 • 
81. 
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capriciously applied and has been disappointing in its' 
results. 54 
It does not appear from the Report that the Commission is 
aware of the inequity in our law in s227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 55 or of the sexist assumptions underlying it. 
The general rule in regard to the protection of one's 
character in court proceedings is found in s197 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. This section provides that an 
accused who gives evidence at criminal proceedings shall not 
be asked or required to answer any questions tending ta show 
that he is of bad character. However, where the conduct of 
his defence involves imputations on the character of the 
complainant or other state witness, the accused loses this 
protection. 5 b 
general rule: 
Section 227 constitutes an exception to this 
where the accused is charged with an offence 
of an indecent nature on a woman, then the section allows 
him to adduce evidence of her character without losing the 
protection afforded to his character in terms of s197. 
Consequently, where a woman alleges that she has been raped, 
sexually assaulted or insulted, 57 the court may inquire into 
54. See Adler ''Rape - The Intention of Parliament and the 
Practice of the Courts'' 1982 45 Modern Law Review 664-
675, and Adler ''The Relevance of Sexual History 
Evidence in Rape: Problems of Subjective 
Interpretation'' 1985 Criminal Law Review 769-780. 
55. Act 51 of 1977. 
56. Section 197(a) of the Act. 
57. The offence of crimen injuria. 
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her character but not into that of the accused. The effect 
of s227 is to place female complainants in cases involving 
indecency on a different footing from male complainants in 
indecency cases or from complainants in other cases. The 
complainant's reputation for chastity and her moral 
character are considered to be relevant to the issue of her 
consent ta the act complained of. The law allows moral 
questions to intrude on the assumption that a woman who once 
consents to intercourse is not likely ta refuse again.es It 
is contended that the fact that the complainant had previous 
intercourse with a person other than the accused is totally 
irrelevant to the question 
complainant in a rape case. 
of her credibility as a 
The link which the law forges 
between her credibility and her prior sexual conduct must 
have as its basis a perceived moral duty to refrain from 
e:< tr a-marital intercourse.ec;, Evidence of prior sexual 
intercourse between the accused and the complainant may or 
may not be relevant to the adjudication of guilt. 
(as our present law and the Commission accept) 
To accept 
that such 
evidence is always and necessarily relevant to show consent 
to the act in question, is to accept th~ assumption that 
agreement to a single instance of intercourse is tantamount 
58. This, of cour·se is taken to reflect her "immoral." 
character. See, for example,~ 1962 3 SA 365 <E) at 
369, where the court expressed the opinion that a 
serious imputation on the character of the complainant 
was not without relevance to the question of the 
accused's guilt. 
59. Wall.€.~r "Victims on Tr·ial - Prosecutions for Rape" 1977 
1 BAG~ 147-162, 153. 
to a blanket consent to intercourse in the future. This is 
an unwarranted notion and an unsound foundation for a legal 
rule. 
In dealing with the complaint requirement in sexual crimes•0 
and the cautionary rule of evidence,• 1 the Commission 
displays a similarly uncritical approach. The method by 
which it arrives at its conclusions and recommendations• 2 is 
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similar to that noted above, in respect of the marital rape 
exemption, viz after listing the arguments for and against 
reform the Commission adopts a recommendation consistent/ 
with the majority opinion. In respect of both the complaint 
the cautionary C" rule,• 4 . the Commission 
concludes that there is no need to reform the law because 
these rules provoked "no noteworthy discussion" at the 
seminar. 615 In other words, the Commission has come to its 
conclusion on the basis of the opinions of those who operate 
the law under consideration. It has adopted their 
conclusions as its own, without giving weight to the 
possibility that these sources are, due to their involvement 
with the law, least likely to be impartial about it. By its 
61!!. Report paras 3.32 to 3. 51!!. 
61. Report paras 3.51 to 3. 71!!. 
6? -· That the e:dsting law should not be changed. 
63. Report para 3.49. 
64" ■ Report para 3.69. 
65. Report. para 3.49. 
over-reliance on these views, the Commission is able to 
avoid dealing with the criticisms of the present law. It 
does not attempt to refute the criticisms which it lists in 
the Report; it simply ignores them. Its conclusions and 
recommendations therefore are not arrived at by a process of 
reasoning but by an article of faith that the majority 
opinion of the "accredited sources" is objectively trL1e and 
authoritative. 
It is submitted that the Report does not address the major 
issue in this area of the law, ie that encoded into the law 
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is a distorted and insulting image of women. The common-
characteristic of the rules examined by the Commission is 
their basic assumption that women who complain of having 
been sexually assaulted are not lightly to be believed~ 
From its starting point of suspicion towards complai~ants, 
the law therefore attempts to provide safeguards against 
false convictions. The law emerges from, and helps to 
perpetuate, social myths about the nature of women. Women-
are characterised in these myths as either psychologically 
disturbed, dishonest or vindictive and are therefore likely 
to lay false rape charg~s against men. Extra caution in 
accepting the validity of a rape complaint is urged in the 
received wisdom that a rape charge is an accusation easily 
made but hard to refute.•• These conventional wisdoms have 
become entrenched in the law and are explicitly justified in 
66. Hale CJ Pleas of the Crown vol 1 634. 
legal literature by eminent authorities.•7 South African 
6 -, I • For example, fear of false accusations expressed by 
courts and commentators often rest on the authority of 
Wigmore Evidence para 924(a) at 736 who states the 
·following: 
"Their Cwomen'sJ psychic comple:<es are. 
multifavious, distorted partly by inherent 
defects, partly by disease, derangements or 
abnormal inst i nets, partly by bad social 
environment, partly by temporary physiological or 
emotional conditions. One form taken by these 
complexes, is that of contriving false charges.of 
sexual offenses by men.... Judging merely from 
the reports of cases in the appellate courts, one 
must infer that many innocent men have gone to 
prison because of tales whose falsity could not be 
e:-: posed. 11 
Similarly, Glanville Williams The 
approves of the corroboration 
following terms: 
Proof of Guilt 159 
requirement in the 
"There is a sound reason for it, because these 
cases are particularly subject to the danger of 
deliberately false charges, resulting from sexual 
neurosis, fantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a 
girl's refusal to admit that she consented to an 
act of which she is now ashamed." 
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law reflects these wisdoms in their legal garb.• 0 \ Their 
effect, it is submitted, is to make conviction in sexual 
cases more difficult to achieve than in other cases. 
Contrary to Hale's famous dictum, it appears to be 
relatively easy to refute a rape charge.• 9 In any event, 
the accused, to secure acquittal, is not obliged to refute 
68. For example, Schreiner, JA, in Rautenbach 1949 1 SA 135 
CA), 143: "It is not only the risk of conscious 
fabrication that must be guarded against; there is also 
the danger that a frightened woman, especially if 
inclined to hysteria, may imagine that things have 
happened which did not happen at all.". 
Lt'!wi s AJA in J 1966 1 SA 88 CR>, 92: "In the case of 
all females alleging sexual assaults, the need for 
similar caution, in the absence of corroboration, flaws 
from the fact that such charges are easily laid and 
difficult for the accused to disprove, and a 
multiplicity of motives may exist for their being 
falsely laid. This has been recognised since time 
immemorial, and a classic example of such a false 
charge can be found in the Biblical story of Potiphar's 
wi·fe and Joseph.". 
See also ~ 1949 2 SA 772 <A>. In this case the 
complainant was a young girl. The court a quo treated 
her evidence with caution and required corroboration 
because of her youth. The accused was convicted. On 
appeal his ~onviction was set aside by the Appellate 
Division because the magistrate, despite having 
required corroboration on account of the complainant's 
youth, "did not bring his mind to bear on the 
additional ri~k arising out of the nature of the 
charge.'' (780). The court stated that had the case not 
been a sexual one, the decision of the court a quo 
could not have been upset on appeal. However, "because 
the magistrate appears to have treated the case as if 
it were, an ordinary one, save for the fact that the 
complainant was a child, it becomes possible and in the 
circumstances necessary for this Court to interfere" 
(783). The magistrate's approach therefore might have 
prejudiced the accused (781). The court allowed the 
appeal, finding that the case against the appellant had 
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, for these 
reasons. 
69. See the case of~ supra n68. 
L 
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or 'disprove' 7 ~ the charge but merely to cast doubt upon the 
state's case. 
Despite evidence to the contrary, the belief that many rape 
charges are false has survived tenaciously. 71 The Report 
refers to a New Zealand study which found that only a small 
percentage of rape charge were false. 72 Data from research 
elsewhere supports this: police women on the New York 
Special Rape Analysis Squad declared unfounded only 2% of 
rape complaints. 73 Whereas police officers in Philadelphia 
judged 18,2% of reported rapes to be unfounded, the local 
social workers estimated the figure to be less than 1%. 74 
The available evidence indicates that the rate of false 
reports of rape is no higher than that for other crimes. 7 ~ 
This is a strong indication that disbelief of the 
70. See the dictum of Lewis AJA, in l cited supra n68. 
71. In Michigan, for e:<ample, complainants are regularly 
required to submit to polygraph tests. See Nordby 
"Reforming Rape Laws - The Michigan E:<perience" in 
Scutt Ced) Rape Law Reform 3-34, 26. The South African 
Law Commission rejected as impractical a proposal to 
introduce psychiatric tests for complainants. Report 
para 3.69. 
72. Report para 3.59. 
73. Brownmiller Against Our Will 435. 
74. Peters et al The Philadelphia Assault Victim Study 97-
98, cited in Katz and Mazur Understanding the Rape 
Victim 2!Z19. 
75. See Katz and Mazur supra n74 207-213. 
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complainant is the conditioned response of those agencies 
with whom she comes into contact. 76 
3. LAW OF PROCEDURE 
Under this head the Commission discusses several important 
matters, viz the protection of the complainant's identity, 
the protection of juvenile witnesses, trials in camera, the 
expeditious processing of rape cases, the possibility of 
legal representation for the complainant and the possibility 
of the adjudication of intrafamilial sexual crimes by the 
proposed family court. 77 Only two proposals are put 
forward, both aiming at a greater measure of protection for 
the victim. The first is a legislated prohibition of any 
particulars which could lead to the identification of a rape 
victim, from the date of the commission of crime (and for 
the duration of the proceedings), except where a presiding 
judicial officer, taking the victim's wishes into 
consideration, consents to publication. 78 Secondly, the 
Report recommends the introduction of legislation providing 
for the automatic hearing of the complainant's evidence in 
camera unless she chooses otherwise. 749 These 
recommendations are welcomed as providing significantly 
76. Levis "The Politics of 
in Scutt Ced) supra n71, 
77. See Report Chapter 5. 
78. Report para 4.16. 
79. Report para 4.60. 
Rape - A Feminist Perspective" 
199-21!15, 21212. 
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increased protection for the victim. It is noteworthy that 
other law reform commissions have not been prepar~d to 
extend such protection to rape victims: The Victorian Law 
Reform Commissioner made no recommendation on this point.em 
The Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South 
Australia rejected a proposal to the effect that the 
victim's evidence be given in camera. 91 
It is regrettable that the Commission did not see fit to 
recommend that 
appointed to 
an independent legal representative be 
act for the complainant in rape cases. 
Representations to this effect were made by the Association 
of Law Societies, Rape Crisis and some members of the 
public. 82 In the view of the Association, such a procedure 
would encourage victims to report the crime, 83 while the 
latter groups expressed the view that lack of representation 
for the complainant is inequitable when the accused has the 
possibility·of legal representation. With a touch of 
arrogance the Commission suggests that the belief that this 
situation is unfair stems from ignorance of the basic 
principl~s of criminal law. 84 It is not explained why such 
80. See Working Paper No 4: Rape Prosecutions, Court 
Procedures and Rules of Evidence <1967). 
81. Special Report: 
40-41. 
Rape and Other Sexual Offences (1976) 
82. Report paras 4.101 and 4.102. 
83. Report para 4.101. 
84. Report para 4.102. 
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knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for a sense of 
justice. It appears from the Report that insufficient 
information was placed before the Commission to enable it to 
investigate the issue thoroughly.a$ This is most 
unfortunate, as the proposal merits serious consideration. 
It is contended that the complainant ought to have the 
benefit of legal representation in every case. The present 
organisation of both the substantive and procedural law 
focuses attention on the complainant rather than on the 
accused: it is her credibility, her sexual biography and her 
moral character which are placed under judicial scrutiny. 
The Commission notes that at present in our courts 
complainants are subject to unfair and unnecessary attack 8 • 
and are not always properly informed of court procedure. 87 
In view of the fact that the prosecutor acts on behalf of 
the state, not of the complainant, it appears not merely 
equitable but necessary that the complainant have a 
representative to act on her behalf. Such representative 
could prepare her for the trial, shield her from some of the 
attack on 
necessary. 
her character and aid the prosecutor when 
Moreover, the representative could argue the 
85. The Report states <para 4.112) that the representations 
proposing a legal representative for the complainant 
did not indicate the precise role the representative 
should assume in the proceedings - a crucial matter. 
The Report does not state why such information, which 
is obviously central to a decision on the matter, was 
not sought by the Commission. 
86. Report para 3.26. 
87. Report para 4.119. 
91 
admissibility of evidence relating to the complainant's 
prior sexual experience with persons other than the accused 
in terms of the Commission's own recommendation.BB It is 
di·fficult to support the Commission's view that more 
training for magi. st.rates and prosecutor·s on the 
'" psychological ' aspects of hancn i ng the rape vi ct i m"B 9 
would reduce the comp 1 a.i nant 's need for her own 
repr·1:?sentat i ve. Such training would be most valuable in 
that it could lead to an increased understanding of and 
sympathy for the complainant. Greater judicial sensitivity, 
however, is no substitute for legal counsel. Until such 
time as rape laws are restructured so as to deal more 
equitably with the complainant, it is submitted that the 
appointment of a legal representative for her is the most 
effective means to protect her interests. 
It is equally to be regretted that the Commission rejected a 
proposal from several concerned bodies (the Law Faculty of 
Unisa, the Association of Law Societies, the Medical 
Association of South Africa, the Council for Social and 
Associated Workers and the Department of Health and 
Welfare) 9 ~ to introduce special procedures to deal with 
juvenile witnesses in sexual cases. South African law at 
88. Report para 3.28. 
92 
89. Report para 4.119. The meaning of this phrase is not 
clear. It is assumed here to mean awareness of the 
nature of the complainant's trauma and training in the 
correct manner of dealing with a traumatised person. 
90. Report para 4.17. 
I 
present makes no special provision for juvenile witnesses. 
They are subject to the same procedure and the same measure 
of protection as adult complainants. The Commission notes a 
unanimous view, expressed in its discussions, that the 
ordinary legal proceedings involve even more trauma for the 
raped child than for the raped adult, 91 a view which is 
strongly supported by the available research findings. 92 
Upon request, the Commission considered whether a special 
procedure specifically for juvenile complainants, similar to 
that adopted in Israel ought to be introduced in South 
Africa. This procedure, the main aim of which is to protect 
the child from further trauma, involves a marked departure 
from the standard procedure: a specialist trained in child 
psychology and psychiatry (called a youth interrogator) 
questions the child and decides, on the basis of the child's 
interests, how to deal with the case. The interrogator 
determines whether the child should appear in court and who 
may question him or her. The evidence gathered in the 
course of the investigation is admissible in court although 
corroboration is required for conviction. The Commission 
91. Report para 4.23. 
92. See Libai "The Protection of the Child Victim of a 
Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System'' 1969 15 
liJi.wne Law Review 977, 112!32; Parker "The Rights of Child 
Witnesses. Is the Court a Protector· or Perpetratc1r?" 
1982 17 New England Law Review 643-717; Melton 
"PsychCllogical Issues in Child Victims' Interaction 
with the Legal System'' 1980 5 Victirnology 274-284; Fot~ 
"Child Witnesses in Se:<ual Abuse Proceedings: Their 
Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for 
Reform" 1985 13 Pepperdine Law Review 157···184. 
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rejects the viability of this procedure in South African law 
and recommends that no alteration be made to the present 
position. 
The apparent basis of this decision is that the procedure 
involves too great a departure from the existing procedure 
and that its implementation would be problematic. 93 In a 
criminal justice system which contemplates adult 
participants, concern for the special treatment of children 
in the system is both legitimate and proper. If the 
interests of child witnesses would be served_by deviation 
from the standard procedure then it is suggested that 
alternative measures which do not infringe upon the 
accused's right to a fair trial should seriously be 
considered. The objections raised to the Israeli procedure, 
ie that the accused has no opportunity to cross examine the 
child and that heresay evidence becomes admissible, are not 
fatal as long as other safeguards are present which ensure a 
fair trial for the accused. It is most unfortunate that, 
having rejected the Isr•eli procedure, the Commission did 
not seriously consider the alternative measures which have 
been proposed in other jurisdictions. 94 
The Commission's treatment of this important matter leaves 
much to be desired. It is difficult to reconcile its 
explicit recognition that child victims are considerably 
93. Report para 4.30. 
94. See Fat~ supra n92 and the references cited therein. 
94 
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more traumatised than adult victims by the standard legal 
procedures9 ~ with its view that "there is no need at present 
for great.er protection of child victims of sexual offences 
in our system". 96 Similar·ly, it notes the unanimous opinion 
a.rising out of its discussions that children are 
increasingly the victims of sexual crimes97 yet it states 
that ''it was pointed out .•. that very few cases involving 
complainants under the age of 14 years occur in practice''. 99 
Ultimately, the Commission's own point of view remains 
obscure. 
What does emerge from the Report, however, is that the 
Commission has made use of two methods for arriving at its 
conclusion. First, as noted above, 99 the Commission adopts 
as its conclusion the majority opinion which was expressed 
in the discussions. It appears that the interested persons 
were the ones to reject the Israeli procedure as too drastic 
an interference -in the South African system. 1 ~~ It is their 
95. Report para 4.23. 
96. Report para 4.37. 
97. Report para 4.23. 
98. Report para 4.35. The apparent conflict between these 
latter sta(ements cannot be explained on the basis that 
the second statement appears under the heading 
"Arguments against reform" and that the Commission was 
simply noting what had been said to it, because the 
Commission explicitly endorses these arguments in its 
conclusion <Report para 4.37). 
99. Supra 71.. 
100. Report paras 4.30, 4.34 and 4.37. 
95 
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consensus that there is no need for greater protection of 
child victims. The only alternative which emerged from the 
discussion was a proposal that in the case of juvenile 
complainants, a social worker be appointed to assist the 
police and to provide added protection for the child. 1 as 1 
The Report states specifically that ''CtJhis proposal was as 
far as the interested parties were willing to go towards 
providing special protection for a child victim 11 • 1 as 2 Yet 
this proposal was not pursued due to the perceived manpower 
shortage. 11zs 3 Secondly, the Commission draws a distinction 
here, as elsewhere in the Report, between theory and 
practice. This distinction enables it to adopt the 
conclusion that while, in theory, the child victim is 
treated as an adult and is vulnerable to secondary trauma in 
the legal process, in practice, this is not so. In practice 
the trial is conducted more informally with all the court 
personnel co-operating to put the child at ease 1 as 4 and the 
child is handled with "great consideration". 1 izt:!:I The source 
of the information that all is well in practice is, of 
course, those persons who are responsible for the practice. 
There is no indication in the Report that tt,e Commission 
sough~ corroboration from any other source. 
11211. Report para 4.32. 
11!!2. Report para 4.32. 
11!13. Report para 4.32. 
11!14. Report para 4.35. 
l 1!15. Report para 4.38. 
96 
The weakness of this method is apparent. While these 
interested parties might have the most detailed knowledge of 
actual practices, their opinions on the fairnass or 
otherwise of the handling of child victims cannot be totally 
impartial. 
actions. 
They cannot be the best judges of their own 
Al.though their opinions are valuable, the 
Commission is not justified in accepting them as decisive. 
By doing so, however, the Commission is able to dispose of 
certain criticisms of the law as being merely "theoretical". 
It is abundantly clear that the Commission takes its cue 
from the expressed opinion of certain interested parties 
whom it believes are authoritative and objective. By the 
devices of over-reliance on these sources and a distinction 
between theory and practice the Commission is able, in 
effect, to ignore important criticisms of the law. This 
97 
process is evident throughout the Report: for instance, the 
Commission recommends no change in the complaint rule 
because there is no reason to believe that the rule is being 
wrongly applied in practice; 1 ~~ the application procedure 
for abortion needs no reform because, though the Abortion// 
and SterilizatioA Act 1 ~ 7 creates the impression of a 
cumbersome and time-consuming procedure, the application of 
its provisions appears to be diff~rent in practice. 1 ~ 9 
106. Report para 3.49. 
107. Act 2 of 1975. 
108. Report para 4.99. See also paras 2.19 and 5.36. 
The Commission has relied heavily on certain sources for 
information as to whether rape-related problems exist and if 
so, what solutions are viable. Its method is to test for 
consensus on each topic and to adopt as its own conclusion 
and recommendation the predominant view. Where there was no 
clear consensus, for example, on the issue of the marital 
rape exemptiori, the Commission attempted to accommodate the 
conflicting opinions in a single recommendation. 1 ~~ The 
Commission therefore displays little independent thought on 
the issues. For some unarticulated reason it considers 
itself obliged to adopt the views of those to whom it 
obviously defers as experts. The resultant Report is more 
of a survey of opinion than an independent investigation. 
4. THE TREATMENT OF THE VICTIM 
In a separate chapter entitled Treatment of the Victim, 11 ~ 
the Commission discusses the administrative practices of the 
various agencies - the police, the district surgeons and 
98 
court personnel in respect of the victim. Wit;J:)_ 
justification, it rejects the view that the victim's trauma 
in the legal process can be alleviated simply by changing 
the law. It accepts that "a change in attitudes and in 
administrative procedures which are applied daily by the 
police, district surgeons and court officials, could most 
11!19. Supra 71. 
110. Report Chapter 5. 
probably make the greatest contribution towards change''. 111 
Consequently, the Commission focuses on the administrative 
practices of these agents and makes recommendations for 
improvements. 
The Commission's discussion of the treatment of the victim 
highlights two basic defects in the investigation: (i) it 
proceeds without a clear concept of the nature of the crime 
and (ii) without a concept of a criminal justice ~ystem. 
(i) The nature of the crime of rape 
The Commission consistently refuses to examine( the soi1al 
and cultural aspects ~-f rape behaviour .J . --- .) It is content to 
label such a perspective "feminist" and, by discrediting it, 
dispose of the need to give it adequate consideration. This 
perspective, though it paints a disturbing picture, should 
not be so cavalierly dismissed. 
From a feminist point of view rape is a social product, 
originating in the structured inequality of .the sexes. 112 
111. Report para 5.3. 
112. In some tribal societies, rape (sometimes gang rape) is 
overtly used as a method for dominating and controlling 
women.· In these "rape prone" societies, female power 
and authority is low, while the outstanding feature of 
"rape free" societies is the relative balance of power 
between the se:-:es: Sanday "The Socia-Cultural Conte:-:t 
of F\ape: A Cross Cultural Study" 1981 37 ( 4) Journal of 
Social Issu-s 5-27. See also Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger Rape and Inequality Chapters 9 - 12. In 
modern, "civilised", industrialised societies, the 
forms of male dominance may be less overt but the link 
between inequality and rape remains. 
99 
Rape practices receive cultural support in the construction 
of a coercive model of "normal" se:-:ual i t.y, ~'>lhi ch tEmds to 
identify normal sexual behaviour with coercion. 113 From 
this perspective, rape is not an exceptional or deviant act; 
it is one of the most overt and extreme forms of the 
exercise of male power. !_!:s deviant quality resides in its 
extremeness, not in its essential difference from normal 
sexual behaviour. Rape is reconceptualised as an assault 
which assumes a sexual form, the social meaning of which is 
to degrade and symbolically annihilate the victim. 114 It is 
113. See Griffin "Rape: The All -American Cr· i me" in Chappell , 
Geis and Geis (eds) Forcible Rape: The Crime, the 
Victim and the Offender 47-66; Clark and Lewis Rape: 
The Price of Coercive Sexuality 125-132; Chodorow 
"Being and doing: A cross·-cultural e:-:amination o·f the 
socialization of males and females" in Gorenick and 
Moran (eds) Women in Sexist Society 259-291. 
114. Data obtained from convicted rapists indicates that__m.§17 
rape for a variety of reasons. In extensive interviews 
wi~h a 114 convicted rapist~ Scully and Morella found 
that, for· ___ sc:ime men, rape was a means of revenge or 
punishment far a perceived wrong~· ·rffe-·rapist (ele,3sed 
iMt~nse hostility or anger on a randomly chosen victim 
who represented far him the individual or category of 
persons being punished. For same of the men, rape was 
an added "bonus" committed in the course of robbery or 
burglary. For 6thers~ ra~e was simply pl~aiurable: it 
was a challenge, an adventure, an "ultimate e:-:perience" 
which made them feel good and, in same cases, elevated 
their self-image. Only 8% of the interviewees 
indicated that gui 1 t was·- part of their emoti anal 
response to the rape. The majority said they felt good 
□-r: ··r·el i eved or felt not.hi ng at al 1. See Scully and 
Morella '''Riding the bull at Gilley's': Convicted 
rapists describe the rewards of rape" 1985 32 (3) 
Social Problems 251-263. See also Levine and Koenig 
Why Men Rape (interviews with convicted rapists). 
onl~ exceptionally the product of individual pathology. 11 ~ 
The feminist position holds that people are socialised to 
excuse or explain rape and other forms of violence against 
women as the product of individual exceptional deviance, 
without general significance for the relations between the 
Therefore we have been conditioned not to perceive 
rape as a method for the control of women. From a critical 
feminist perspective, this hidden dimension of rape becomes 
visible: as a political device, the threat or possibility of 
rape is a controlling factor in women's lives 11 ~ and 
115. See Perdue and L!?ster "Personality Characteristics of 
Rapists" 1972 35 Per·ceptual and Motor Skills 514. The 
authors conclude after administering Rorshach tests to 
convicted rapists, that rapists do not differ 
significantly from those convicted of aggressive non-
sexual crimes. Cited in Clark and Lewis supra n113 
21~3. Fisher and Rivlin "Psychological needs of 
Rapists" 1971 11 British Journal of Criminology, 182-5 
employed standard psychological tests to study rapists. 
The authors interpret their findings to be "consonant 
with the theory that the act of rape is an expression 
of hostility by a male who feels weak, inadequate and 
dependent". See also Cohen et al "The Psychology of 
Rapists" in Chappell, Geis and Geis (eds) supra nll3 
291-313; Gibbens, Way and Soothill "Behavioural Types 
of Rape" 1977 131!1 British Journal of Psychiatry 32-42. 
116. Two studies strongly support the contention that fear 
of rape can be a potent constraining for~e in women's 
lives. They both found that ~omen h~veft high level of 
f~~r ~i- victimisation although-lhe fear is not equally 
distributed amongst· all women. The level of fear is 
linked to the perception of the degree of risk of 
victimisation. Both studies conclude that fear of rape 
significantly restricts women's activities, their 
spatial mobility and their life choices. See Warr 
"Fear of rape among urban women" 1985 32 (3) Social 
Problems 238-25121; Riger and Gordon "The Fear of Rape: A 
Study in Social Control" 1981 37 (4) Journal of Social 
Issues 71-92. 
encourages their dependence on men for protection.11? As 
such it is a mechanism helping to perpetuate the inequality 
between the sexes. 
An historical analysis of rape law supports this view. What 
the contemporary law knows as rape was in ancient law, a 
species of theft. The "crime" was the theft of virginity. 
In law this constituted a wrong against the girl's father. 
His loss was the reduction in the brideprice of his daughter 
due to the damage she suffered. Recompense was made to him 
far the net loss to his estate. Rape law was thus closely 
linked with marriage in ancient society and served to 
reinforce marrl~g~ transactions. Women's chastity and 
117. The possibility or fear of rape causes many women to 
restrict their daily activities in various ways. This 
system of self-imposed restricti6n is encouraged by 
those who, in good faith, would advise women on how to 
avoid being raped. The Medical Association of South 
Africa, for example, has published a booklet for public 
di~tribution, Rape: The Full Story. The booklet 
advises certain precautions for women which include the 
following: 
( i ) 
(ii ) 




Look as tough as possible when you walk. 
Keep to well lit streets with houses. Avoid 
alleys, open fields, deserted shopping centres 
and other deserted places. 
Walk in the middle of the road. 
If alone at home, keep the doors locked. 
Do not let anyone know you are at home alone. 
Do not open the door to anyone you do not know 
and trust. 
(vii) Do not get into a lift if there is only one man 
in it and you feel unsafe. 
(viii) Do not hitch-hike alone. 
This practical advice may prevent some women from being 
raped, but it cannot address the basic problem. One 
rarely ~inds this sort of advice being offered to the 
potential rapist, for instance, on how to avoid 
situations in which he may be tempted to commit rape. 
reproductive powers were counted as assets in the estate of 
the male who had power over them, ie the father and, 
subsequently, the husband. These assets were exchanged for 
a price in marriage. Loss of virginity had significant 
financial implications for the father who was allowed to 
demand an amount equivalent to the brideprice from the 
transgressing male. This position obtained irrespective of 
whether the loss of virginity was occasioned by consensual 
or non-consensual intercourse. The daughter could not 
freely dispose of an asset to which she had no title. 118 
Rape law thus reflects the radically different statuses of 
men and women in ancient society. Its history reveals a 
slow evolution from its origins as theft of a guardian's 
assets to a wrong agai·nst the victim herself and is an i nde:-: 
of the changing status of women. While it cannot seriously 
be contended that women today have a status assimilable to 
that of property, as in ancient law, the link between rape 
and women's status remains. Rape laws today continue to 
buttress marriage practices because they protect a woman's 
"honour" which is still an important bargaining tool in the 
marriage exchange. The Commission is therefore not 
justified in ignoring this link. The fact that it does so, 
however, has important implications for its perception of 
the crime, the criminal and the victim. 
118. See Epstein Se:-: Laws and Customs in ~ludaism; Johns The 
Oldest Code of Law in the World; Old Testament Exodus 
22:15-16 and Deuteronomy 22:28-29; Attenborough The 
Laws of the Earliest English Kings. 
1 !Zl3 
Unfortunately the Commission considers none of this. 
Implicit in the Report is a perception of rape as a crime 
without cultural and structural dimensions. The act of rape 
is therefore deprived of social and political meaning and 
seems to be understood in terms of the individual pathology 
of the rapist. 
Most crucially, the Commission's attitude precludes it from 
understanding the victim's trauma. It assumes that the 
trauma, or alleged trauma, if it exists, is caused largely 
by unsympathetic policemen, doctors and magistrates. While, 
on one level this may be true, it is not all the truth. A 
refusal to consider the cultural definition and received 
wisdom on rape (in which are entrenched notions of the 
victim as damaged and defiled) allows it to trivialise the 
trauma. The victim is not traumatised when the district 
surgeon is unsympathetic; the shack stems from the physical 
and/or emotional violence done to her and from the deeply-
embedded cultural notion that rape defiles the victim and 
devalues her. Callous treatment by the criminal justice 
I 
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personnel constitutes a secondary trauma which can serve ta 
reinforce the primary trauma of the rape itself. 11 q 
The Commission does not recognise adequately the nature of 
the crime or the uniqueness of the complainant's position in 
the law. It is argued here that the social control of women 
through rape operates through two processes: through fear 
generated by actual or potential rape and, secondly through 
the legal processing of rape cases in the criminal justice 
system. It is the latter component of control which is the 
subject of the Commission's inquiry. The present 
construction of rape law situates the victim as pivotal to 
the proceedings. 120 Particularly when the defence of 
consent is raised, the major issue in a rape trial is 
whether or not the complainant has been victimised. 
Judicial focus on the victim, her sexual morality and 
experience, allows the agents of the state to decide this 
question according to male defined-standards of sexual 
morality fo~ women. It is submitted that the real issue in 
119. Burgess and Holmstrom have investigated the emotional 
and psychological effects of rape on the victim: see 
"Rape Trauma Syndrome" in Chappell, Geis and Geis (eds) 
supra n113 315-328 and "Rape: Its Effect on Task 
Performance at Varying Stages in the Life Cycle" in 
Walker and Brodsky (eds) Sexual Assault 23-33; Kaufman 
et al "Male Rape Victims: Non-Institutionalized 
Assault'' 1980 37 American Journal of Psychiatry 122. 
It is noteworthy that, despite the Report's frequent 
reference to the victim's "trauma", it contains no 
working definition of the trauma. The Commission's 
understanding of the nature and effects of the crisis 
is nowhere made explicit. 
120. See supra 'Law of Evidence'. 
1!Zl5 
a rape case is whether to grant or deny to the complainant 
the status of a victim. The more the circumstances of the 
rape conform to those of "true rape" and the more the 
complainant is judged to conform to traditional sexual 
morality, the greater is the likelihood of the court 
recognising her as a victim. 
is no crime. 
If there is no victim, there 
The successful prosecution of a rape case involves a 
contradiction for the victim: public recognition of her 
status as a victim is a condemnation of the aggression she 
has suffered and a public recognition that she has been 
wronged. Yet in cultural terms, it is also a rite de 
passage for the victim to a devalued status to which shame 
is attached. The search for official justice involves the 
ascription of this devalued status. This, it is contended, 
is the notion which underlies attempts to protect the victim 
by keeping her out of public view. The Commission misses 
this point in its opinion that the complainant in a sexual 
crime is ''in a special position because she has to testify 
about intimate matte~s ••• ''. 121 Other persons may also have 
to testify about intimate matters in court, for example, 
spouses in a contested divorce case. While this may be 
embarrassing, it is not comparable with the position of the 
rape victim. 
121. Report para 4.46. 
11Z!6 
From its failure to recognise the unique aspects of rape, 
the Commission cannot appreciate the necessity for special 
measures in respect of rape cases. Two examples illustrate 
this. In the first, the Commission accepts as trite that 
evidence concerning the complainant's character will always 
be relevant for the purposes of sentencing. 122 Accordingly, 
it recommends that no legislative provisions be enacted to 
regulate the inclusion of such evidence for sentencing 
purposes. 
It is argued here that the notion that the "character" of a 
victim of a crime should influence the sentencing process is 
~p~ally indefensible. A brutal attack_ on an unemployed, 
alcoholic vagrant should be seen as no less grave an offence 
than a similar attack on a prominent, upstanding member of 
the community. Whatever other variables are operative, the 
character of the victim should not, it is submitted, affect 
either conviction or sentence. One might argue that the 
severity of punishment ought to reflect the amount of social 
harm caused and that such amount depends on the character or 
social worth of the victim. Thus Snyman 123 has advanced the 
view that, in the context of the defence of necessity, the 
killing of a person of great social value causes greater 
social har~ than the killing of, for example, the vagrant 
mentioned above. While it is agreed that the amount of 
122. Report para 3.27. 
123. Snyman Criminal Law 93. 
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social damage occasioned by a criminal act should be taken 
into account, the present objection to this view is that it 
tends to evaluate social harm exclusively in terms of the 
results of the act in question and this, in turn, is 
calculated in terms of the social utility of the victim. It 
underplays the factor of social harm in the act of 
aggression itself. Differential sentencing on this basis is 
unjustifiable and conflicts with the principle of equal 
protection for all under the law. The view proposed by 
Snyman has not received public support. 
In rape cases on the other hand, an analogous view has been 
~~p}icitly endorsed by the Appellate Division. Schreiner JA 
in Sibande124 stated that the rape of a prostitute "would 
not ordinarily call for a penalty of equal severity to that 
imposed [far rape] upon a woman of refinement and good 
character". Aeart from the marital rape exemption South 
African law does not recognise any category of women ta 
which the law of rape does not apply. Thus, while a man may 
be found guilty of the rape of a prostitute, the law accepts 
this as less grave an act than the rape of a nan-prostitute. 
The law therefore accepts in principle that women can be 
categorised according to their character or their sexual 
worth. This is clear support for the feminist point that, 
in a male-dominant society, rape law is criminalised to 
protect a woman's "honour". For women, "honour II or "good 
124. 1958 3 SA 1 <A> at 6. 
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character'' is defined in terms of virginity, chastity or 
fidelity to a husband. 12~ Women's social worth is evaluated 
according to their se:-:ual worth which, in turn, is 
calculated in terms of their adherence or otherwise to male-
defined standards of sexual behaviour. From this point of 
view, the prostitute has little or no honour to protect. 
The less honour a woman has, the less punishment is 
warranted for its violation. This_sqcial and highly sexist 
categorisation ot women has been absorbed into the law and 
it re-appears to gain acceptance as an apparently neutral 
legal principle. The Commission certainly accepts it as 
such and does not perceive the need to alter the present 
position. 
The'second example which illustrates the Commission's lack 
of appreciation for the special problems associated with 
rape cases, is found in its discussion on the length of time 
taken to dispose of rape cases. 12~ Although the Commission 
recog~ises that a prolonged legal process may add greatly to 
- -· -
the victim's trauma it accepts that the arguments against 
legislative intervention outweigh contrary 
considerations. 127 These arguments are the familiar ones of 
lack of manpower and impracticability and, more importantly, 
the perception that there is no justification for giving 
125. Rich, Women and Honour: Some Notes on Lying 1, cited in 
Jaggar Feminist Politics and Human Nature 253. 
126.· Report paras 4.61 to 4-.82. 
127. Report para 4.77. 
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priority to the speedy processing of rape cases as this 
would conflict with the way in which cases are presently 
given priority. 128 Support for this proposition is found in 
the view, apparently endorsed by the Commission, that 
complainants in other cases may also experi~nce a degree of 
trauma comparable with that of the rape victim. 12q Granting 
priority to rape cases is perceived as unduly favouring the 
rape victim. 
No one can seriously contend that rape victims are the only 
persons for whom legal proceedings may be disruptive, 
emtiarrassing and painful at times. 13w However, to equate 
the discomforts experienced in other criminal cases with the 
trauma of the rape victim, is to ignore a considerable body 
of psychological evidence as to th~ nature of such 
t~auma. 131 Studies indicate that many victims experience 
rape as a frightening, life-threatening attack, involving 
strong, destructive feelings of guilt, shame and self-
rejection. The trauma frequently involves a long-term 
128. Report para 4.76. It is submitted that the reasoning 
here is spurious. The Report does not state that this 
is impossible to do, simply that, in the way priority 
is allocated at present, a more expeditious processing 
of rape cases cannot be accommodated. In the light of 
a perceived problem, what must be investigated is the 
feasibility of changing the way in which cases are 
granted priority on the court role. 
129. Report para 4.76. 
130. For example, the parent who gives evidence on the 
kidnapping of his or her child or the person who gives 
evidence on the murder of a spouse. 
131. See supra n88. 
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psychological disorganisation of the victim. 1 32 It is a 
reaction to the acute stress of the rape. Counselling is 
often required to enable her to reorganise her life and 
integrate the rape into it. Deep depression is common, 
involving disturbed sleep patterns and recurrent nightmares. 
Irrespective of any physical harm she may suffer, the 
psychological and emotional effect of rape on the victim 
includes an aspect which is not present in other crimes. In 
a society in which women's worth is tied primarily to their 
sexuality and reproductive powers, a sexual assault attacks 
not only the body but also the perceived social value of the 
person. The abuse of female sexuality in rape carries the 
social meaning of degradation and symbolic annihilation of 
the person, even if it does not physically kill the victimr-
It is this specific cultural dimension to rape which gives 
it a peculiarly devastating potential for the victim, which 
is not shared by other victims. The Commission fails to 
appreciate the harmful effect on such a traumatised person 
of delays in the legal process. Mayne and Levett 133 give 
examples of South African cases in which lengthy legal 
processing and uncertainty as to the date of final 
disposition retarded the victims' progress and added 
132. See Kilpatrick, Resick and Veronen "Effects of a Rape 
Experience: A Longitudinal Study'' 1981 37(4) Journal of 
Social Issues 105-122. 
133. Mayne and Levett "The Traumas 





considerably ta their trauma. It is arguable that, if the 
Commission had been mare aware of the nature and gravity of 
the victim's trauma, it might not have made the statement 
that it would be "wrong" in principle to give priority 
"arbitrarily" to ra.pe trials 
suggested here that giving 
over other cases. 134 It is 
priority to rape cases would be 
neither arbitrary nor wrong but would be justifiable on the 
grounds of the special problems of the rape victim. The 
objections of shortage of manpower and impracticability are 
not fatal. The Commission's conclusion represents a policy 
decision to the effect that the problems of the rape victim 
do not merit an alteration in the present system. The 
decision reflects the low priority accorded to rape-related 
issues in the criminal justice system. 
(ii) The Criminal Justice System 
The second basic defect in this 
been alluded to elsewhere. 13e 
section of the Report has 
While this weakness 
undermines the entire Report, it becomes acute in the 
section on the treatment of the victim. 
The Report attempts to identify what 
unacceptable treatment of the rape victim. 
constitutes 
This is a 
laudable attempt, consistent with the Commission's view that 
a change in the law alone will not bring about significant 
134. Report para 4.78. 
135. See supra 7-8. 
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results. The weakness of the Commission's approach, 
however, is that it assumes that changes in administrative 
procedure~ do so 136 and it fails to take into account the 
context in which these practices occur. 
The Report's discussion of the role of the police 
demonstrates this. It is a cursory description of how the 
police view their function and what their activities are, 
viz taking a full statement, collecting evidence and sending 
the victim for a medical examination. In its conclusion, 
the Report outlines three major critici~ms of the police: 
( i ) 
(ii ) 
( u. i) 
an unsympathetic and often sceptical attitude 
towards victims; 
inadequate knowledge of the correct ~rocedures; 
specific investigation procedures, such as several 
interrogation sessioni and identity parades. 137 
Ultimately, it considers that these criticisms ar·e 
unfounded. In respect of the first, it is content with the 
knowledge that ''senior officers are aware of the f~ct that 
the investigation procedure is traumatic for the complainant 
and that an attempt is being made to bring this home to all 
policemen in their training". 13• Exactly what the police 
perceive the trauma .to be is not explained. As regards the 
second criticism, it draws attention to the existence of 
standing orders in which the investigation procedure is set 
136. Report paras 1.11 and 5.5. 
137. Report para 5.33. 
138. Report para 5.33. 
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out and considers that ''[tJo expect that an experienced 
officer will always be on hand where a complaint of rape is 
laid, is to e:<pect the impossible". 13 ... Why an ine:<per·ienced 
officer should also be ignorant of the standing orders, 
requires explanation. Thirdly, the Commission considers 
that nothing can be done about the existing investigation 
procedures. 14IIZI The following paragraph summarises the 
Commission's approach: 
"The South African Police deserve praise for what 
is already being done in this regard. It is 
alleged that instances still occur in practice 
which are not handl~d according to theory. Such 
things are bound to happen in any big organisation 
and unfortunately these instances are newsworthy 
and are reported, unlike those cases where the 
theory is adhered to slavishly. The Commission 
recommends that in-service training be continued 
to limit these instances to the minimum." 141 
Several criticisms can be directed towards the Commission's 
treatment of the topic. First, and most obviously, it is a 
most cursory descriptive sketch of what the police 
themselves claim they do. Secondly, the account is placed 
in a social, 1 egal and institutional vacuum. An 
under-standing of the nature and importance of the police 
must be grounded on an appreciation of their position in the 
criminal JGsti~e system and their consider-able powers. 
139. Report para 5.34. 
140. Report para 5.35. 
141. Report para 5.36. 
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The police are in a very real sense the "gatekeepers" 142 of 
the criminal justice system 
strategically vital position. 
and, as such, occupy a 
The laying of a rape charge 
constitutes the complainant's point of entry into the 
system. Police actions at this point are crucially 
important to the outcome of the case and cannot be 
understood from the administrative procedures alone. The 
legal and institutional framework within which the police 
carry out their functions must be considered. What are the 
police powers, limitations, duties and extent of discretion? 
These legal factors shape polite activities. Legal rules do 
not constitute a formalised script to be acted out. Rather, 
the law may be viewed as a source of authority for official 
a.ction; it allows the agents "space" within which to act and 
it provides a source of legitimation for their actions. 143 
E:-:amining only the rules gives a ~artial view. An 
understanding of whether and, if so, which police practices 
constitute unacceptable treatment of the rape victim 
necessitates an examination of how the police interpret 
their roles and how they use their powers and discretion. 
142. Goldstein "Police discretion not to invoke the criminal 
justice process: Low visibility decisions in the 
administration of justice" 1961!! 69 Yale Law Journal 
543-558. 
143. See, in general, Skolnick Justice without T~ial; 
Ericson and Baranek The Ordering of Justice: A Study of 
Accused Persons as Dependants in the Criminal Justice 
Syst..§.!!l.; Bottomly Decisions in the Penal Process; 
Bottoms and McClean Defendants in the Criminal Process; 
McBarnet Conviction: Law. the State and the 
Construction of Justice. 
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The Commission, for example, never considers how the police 
use their discretionary power to refuse to open a docket. 
How do the police relate ta the victim and the accused and 
how do these perceptions relate to the routine gathering of 
evidence?144 It is essential ta consider these issues in a 
serious investigation into the proper handling of rape cases 
in the criminal justice system. 
There is evidence from rape victims themselves to indicate 
that police behaviour towards rape victims is (at least 
fairly often) insensitive. Brawnmiller's research supports 
this. She documents beliefs expressed by police officers 
that it is not possible to rape an unconsenting woman 14~ and 
that rape complainants are "prostitutes who didn't get their 
money''. 146 A Philadelphia study attempted ta understand the 
manner in which police officers arrive at a decision whether 
to advise the prosecution of a rape case or not. 147 The 
police in this study did not accept every rape complaint as 
valid. Complaints which involved strangers, weapons or 
violence were mast likely to be believed by the police 
144. On the exercise of police discretion to advise 
prosecution or not ("founding" or "unfounding" a case) 
see Le Grand "Rape and Rape Laws: Se:dsm in Society and 
Law" in Chappell, Geis and Geis (eds) supra n113 71 and 
Clark and Lewis supra n113 58-60. 
145. Brownmiller supra n73 365. 
146. Brawnmiller supra n73 366. 
147. "Police Discretion and the 
been Committed Rape 
University of Pennsylvania 
Judgment that a Crime has 
in Philadelphia" 1968 117 
Law Review 277-322. 
116 
officers. All rapes which were reported to have occurred 
between parties who had gone out together on the day in 
question were unfounded. The police declared unfounded 22% 
of black-on-black rapes but only 12% of white-on-white 
rapes. The author states that ''[iJt appears impossible •.. 
not to conclude that the differential •.. resulted primarily 
from lack of confidence in the 
complainants and a belief in 
veracity of 
the myth of 
black 
black 
promiscuity''. 148 Where victims showed no physical battery, 
the police conducted investigations in only 42% of the 
cases. With limited time and resources at their disposal, 
officers would not investigate cases which in their opinion 
and from their knowledge of the courts, had a low 
probability of successful prosecution. It is noteworthy 
that Mayne and Levett 14q give examples of similar police 
behaviour in South Africa. 
This data indicates that the police believe at least some of 
the cultural myths about rape, for example, that it is 
impossible to rape an unwilling woman, that a complainant is 
a prostitute whose client refused to pay for her 
services. 1 em It is probable that this view of rape and rape 
victims influences the manner in which the police carry out 
their functions. The police in the Philadelphia study, for 
148. At 304. 
149. Mayne and Levett supra n133. 
150. Brownmiller supra n73. 
117 
e:-:ampl e, appeared to operate with a notion of a "true rape" 
which conformed to the stereotype of an alleyway attack by a 
stranger wielding a weapon. 
complaints accordingly. 
They reacted to the various 
These factors are of great significance for the processing 
of rape cases. Even where the police do conduct an 
investigation, their beliefs and assumptions relating to 
rape may influence the collection of evidence for the 
state's C:.:.\se. The action of the police in the exercise of 
this function may be decisive for subsequent proceedings. 
It may influence the decision of whether or not to prosecute 
the accused Cie whether there is a strong or weak case 
against him> and may influence the outcome of the trial. An 
investigation into rape in Swaziland revealed that both the 
police and the prosecution are apparently fairly often 
unwilling to investigate rape cases thoroughly. The study 
notes instances in which material evidence is either not 
collected or not produced at the trial, resulting in the 
acquittal of the accused. 1 ~ 1 
The Commission does not consider the possibility of the 
systematic use of rules and authority in a biased manner by 
the police. While it might be objected that such an inquiry 
lies far beyond the concerns of law reform, a failure to 
pursue it is no basis for a conclusion that the police are 
151. Armstrong 
s~-.iaz i land II 
"A note on several aspects 
1986 XIX CILSA 474-482, 477. 
of rape in 
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doing a fine job and ought to be congratulated. Perhaps 
they are; but the Commission Report obscures more than it 
reveals so it is impossible to verify this. Its attempt to 
probe beyond the legal rules has led the Commission to 
ignore them and to focus on administrative procedures and 
police accounts of their activities. Reform is perceived as 
a question of modifying, at most, certain administrative 
procedures and not the law on which they rest. The weakness 
of this approach is evident from the Report. For instance, 
it leads the Commission to reject as "undesirable" 
legislation which would attempt to ensure certain standards 
of conduct in the investigation and handling of rape 
charges, apparently on the basis that its effectivity would 
depend on the standard of police training. 1 ~ 2 
It is submitted that the Commission's view is quite 
untenable. The desirability or otherwise of the legislation 
152. Report para 5.36. The Commission's opinion is obscure. 
It is not certain from the Report whether the 
Commission regards such legislation as positively 
"undesirable" or simply irrelevant, as its 
effectiveness depends (in its view) on the standard of 
training of the police officers. The Commission does 
not give due weight to the consideration that the 
absence of legislation means the absence of necessary 
legislative control over police behaviour. It assumes 
somewhat simplistically, that ''if policemen are ma.de 
aware through training of the fact that speedy 
completion of the medical examination will make things 
easier for the complainant, they will realize the need 
to get the complainant to the district surgeon as soon 
as possible" (Report para 5. 36). It is contended here 
that the assumption that an awareness of this need will 
automatically lead to speedy action is questionable, as 
it does not take into account the possibility that 
notwithstanding an awareness of the problem the 
police might accord it little importance. 
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does not depend in any way on the standard of police 
training. If, as the Commission suggests, police training 
at present is of such a low standard that it would 
jeopardize the successful implementation of the law, the 
solution is to secure a higher standard of training. 
Contrary to the Commission's view, the submission made here 
is that legislative intervention is required, which would 
establish minimum standards in the acceptable processing of 
rape cases. The law should lay down objective criteria by 
)which to judge police 
I 
behaviour. This step would be fair 
I 
\towards the police who would henceforth be fully aware of 
the standards required of them and, if the law provided an 
effective remedy for non-compliance, it would be of value to 
the complainant. At present, the absence of such regulation 
is part of the underlying problem. Sound and effective 
legal reform must include greater legislative control over 
the actions of the criminal justice personnel to render them 
more accountable. 
Throughout its investigation into the treatment of the 
victim, the Commission consistently attributes problems 
experienced by rape victims to minor dysfunctions in the 
system, such as inexperienced officials 1 e 3 and work 
overload 1 e 4 • The Commission confidently recommends more in-
) 
service training as the major solution on the assumption 
153. Report paras 5.67 and 5.34. 






that once there are more adequately trained personnel the 
system will operate more smoothly and the victim's problems 
will be over. 11515 The recommendations are thus to the effect 
that more in-service training for policemen and doctors is 
desirable, that the authorities should, in training or by 
way of circulars, stress the necessity for giving the victim 
information on venereal disease and that the importance of 
pre-trial consultations be "brought home to 
prosecutors 11 • 1 t!'S<fi> 
While well-trained personnel are vital to the operation of 
the system, it is unrealistic to believe that an extra 
lecture here and there or an extra departmental circular can 
bring about significant change. Where the Commission could 
have put forward~ substantive proposal, it declined to do 
so: 
"fn principle the Commission would have liked to 
recommend the establishment of rape squads in the 
metropoliian areas because this could have obvious 
advantages in raising the standard of training. 
It appears, however, that such a recommendation 
would not be practicable and is therefore not 
made. 11 1157 
At this point one begins to wonder what the purpose of the 
investigation is. If the Commission is of the view that a 
specialist rape squad would be a worthwhile innovation it 
should surely make a recommendation to that effect. Failure 
155. Report paras 5.36, 5.67, 5.78 and 5.94. 
156. Report para 5.93. 





ta do so is an abdication of its task. The proposal is, in 
fact, not an unrealistic or impossible one. The South 
African Police has established several specialist squads -
murder and robbery, drugs and fraud units - and it would be 
in line with this organisation to establish a rape squad. 
Mere impracticability is no reason not to make the 
recommendation. In any event, according to whose opinion is 
this impracticable? It is on the strength of the 
perceptions of the South Afri~an Police as to manpower 
shortages and the necessity for such a squad in the light of 
the number of reported rapes, that the Commission declines 
to make its recommendation. Its reason is therefore 
spurio~s. The unwillingness of the South African Police to 
establish a rape squad most probably reflects the low level 
of importance which it accords to rape in comparison with 
other crimes. This view gains credence in the light of the 
recent decision of the South African Police to establish a 
specialist mugging squad in Cape Town. 13e 
The Commission's apparent timidity leads it to make weak and 
half-hearted resolutions. For instance, in its discussion 
of the medical examination of rape victims, it notes that 
the multi-purpose centres which have been established in 
certain cities13q make ''the greatest and most practical 
158. Cape Times Friday 6 February 1987. 




contribution to the alleviation of victim trauma 11 • 1 • 121 It 
rejects, however, the need for organisation of these 
services on a national level. In view of its positive 
evaluation of these centres, the Commission's recommendation 
is disappointing. It recommends that "the authorities 
concerned with provincial hospitals .•. should take 
cognizance of the success of the existing, victim centres 
and consider the establishment of similar centres'1 • 1 • 1 This 
recommendation amounts to a proposal that the authorities 
think about the issue and decide for themselves whether to 
establish more centres or not. As a reform proposal, it is 
mean i r1g less. 
Similarly, in dealing with the medical and psychiatric 
aftercare of the victim, the Commission is fully aware of 
the problems of pregnancy and venereal disease 1 • 2 and the 
role that district surgeons could play in preventing their 
occurrence. Unfortunately, it again fails to take the 
opportunity to make a recommendation to deal effectively 
with these problems which fall squarely within the terms of 
its brief. The most the Commission is prepared to do is td 
recommend ''that the Department of Health and Welfare give 
serious consideration 
district surgeons ••• 
161!1. Report para 5.66. 
161. Report para 5.66. 
1 : ·; ··1 !''• :':':) !5 .. .. '.'i? ·. 
to laying down the policy that 
must include treatment to prevent 
pregnancy as part of the medico-legal examinatibn of 
victims, if the victim so desires'' ~nd that it be provided 
at public expense. 1 • 3 
In both these instances the criticism directed at the 
Commission is not that its recommendation is undesirable or 
inappropriate but that it has failed to make a meaningful 
recommendation at all. The nationwide availability of 
crisis centres to which victims can go to receive all the 
help they need and a state-supported system of information 
and aid in disease and pregnancy prevention are vitally 
important matters for rape victims. The fact that there are 
so few centres and that district surgeons are not bound to 
advise or aid the victims in this way are matters of grave 
concern which merit positive and helpful recommendations. 
In respect of the latter, for example, the Commission 
apparently did not consider the possibility of legislation 
to make compulsory a system of routine medical treatment for 
victims including the availability of effective and safe 
contraception. Serious consideration should have been given 
to greater legal regulation of these matters, the lack of 
which, it is submitted, is part of the problem. 
This tendency of the Commission reaches its logical 
conclusion in its discussion of the attitude of court 
personnel towards rape victims. The Commission considers 
two proposals in this sensitive area: first, a proposal 
163. Report para 5.78. 
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that special courts for sexual offences be created, staffed 
by specially trained personnel, sensitive to the problems of 
the rape victim. Secondly, it considers an alternative 
proposal that rape cases regularly be channelled to a group 
o-f suitable officials trained v-i i th th r~ m • 1 6 4 
Although the latter proposal found general s:;upport, the 
Commission decided against a general directive to this 
Its recommendation is that "it. be 1 e·f t to the 
heads of magistrates' offices and senior public prosecutors 
to decide whether such channelling would be feasible in 
their specific circumstances, and, if so, whether in their 
case such a step would in any way serve to alleviate the 
rape victim's trauma". 16"'' The Commission has recommended 
that someone else decide on the feasibility of the proposal, 
decide whether to implement it or not and also judge whether 
the proposed measure solves the problem. This represents a 
complete evasion of its duty as~ law reform Commission. 
The Commission expresses, with a touch of self-satisfaction, 
its gratification that, even before its completion, the 
investigation began to produce results. It notes that the 
Justice Training Branch had decided to include a lecture on 
the psychological aspects of the complainant as part of the 
magistrates' and prosecutors' courses on sexual crimes. 
164. Report para 5.85. 
165. Report para 5.93. 
166. Report para 5.93. 
This measure, it believes, will do much to alleviate the 
problems of the victim in the courtroom. 167 
The Commission's bureaucratic orientation, is especially 
apparent in its treatment of judicial attitudes towards the 
complainant. It perceives the problems of the rape victim 
in the courtroom mainly in terms of 
concerns of efficient court organisation. 
the bureaucratic 
An inquiry into 
the victim's problems is collapsed into a discussion of 
better, ie more efficient, court functioning. According to 
the Report, the victim's problems are due mainly to the 
prosecutor's problems of an overloaded schedule which does 
not allow him or her enougt1 time to prepare adequately for 
the case, to hold a pre-trial consultation with the 
victim 168 or to prepare her for the trial procedure. 1 •q The 
underlying assumption is that, if prosecutors had more time, 
the victim would have no more problems. Because the 
Commission perceives these problems in bureaucratic terms, 
it considers only bureaucratic solutions, viz the 
institution of special sexual offences courts or the more 
informal channelling of rape cases to a group of selected 
officials. 17~ These proposals are also evaluated mainly 
according to criteria which are administratively 
167. Report para 5.94. 
168. This occurs mainly in the regional courts where the 
majority of cases are heard. Report para 5.82. 
169. Report paras 5.83 and 5.84. 
170. Report para 5.85. 
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important. 171 The Commission's consideration of this 
significant matter never transcends the bureaucratic level 
of understanding. 
It is contended that the rape victim's problems cannot be 
understood solely or even predominantly in these terms. 
What the Commission fails to appreciate is that a rape 
victim is highly likely to be a person in acute emotional 
and psychological distress and her successful recovery may 
be severely hampered by insensitive and unsympathetic 
treatment by the officials involved in her case. The 
criticism directed towards these officials in general is not 
so much their inefficiency as their attitude towards the 
victim. The Commission fails to consider the possibility 
that behind the "administrative" reason for the victim's 
problems ( i e the manpower shortage) lies the more 
intractable problem of prejudicial attitude towards the 
victim. For example, a prosecutor who routinely does not 
pr~pare the victim for the ordeal of the trial might simply 
not perceive the need to do so. He or she might be ignorant 
of the special problems of the rape victim or might believe, 
along with the policeman noted by Brownmiller, 172 that a 
rape victim is a prostitute who has not received her money. 
In either case, to grant the prosecutor more time will make 
little or no difference to his or her routine processing of 
171. Report paras 5.88 to 5.91. 
172. Supra n73. 
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rape cases. The Commission's underlying assumption that it 
will do so is, at best, extremely doubtful. 
It seems clear that the reason of lack of time and manpower, 
as an explanation of the failure of the system to meet the 
needs of the rape victim, is spurious. The Report indicates 
that the usual practice in the regional court where the 
majority of rape cases are heard, is not to hold pre-trial 
consultations with the victim. 173 If this is the accepted 
practice in these courts, 
bureaucratic processing 
then it has become part of the 
of r·ape cases. The limited 
resources available to the courts means that these must be 
carefully allocated if the courts are to continue to 
·function. The allocation of time and manpower therefore 
reflects the priorities of the system. The regional courts 
do not, it is submitted, routinely omit the pre-trial 
consultation with rape victims because there is no time for 
them but because the consultations are low on the list of 
bureauc~atic priorities. The lack of time is a result of a 
choice to allocate resources elsewhere in accordance with 
the system of pric.)rit.ies. Furthermore, it is probable that 
the low priority is partly due to widespread adherence by 
the officials concerned to some of the entrenched cultural 
myths about rape and rape victims. Indeed, it would be 
astonishing if those who operate the South African criminal 
justice system were totally uninfluenced in their behaviour 
173. Report para 5.82. 
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towards the victim by these apparently cross-cultural social 
beliefs which, as demonstrated above, 174 have become 
entrenched in the law. A deeper understanding of the 
problems experienced by rape victims in court therefore 
necessitates an investigation into judicial attitudes 
towards the crime and the· victims. The Report notes 17~ but 
does not address the criticism advanced to it that cultural 
myths about rape influence the attitude of the court towards 
the victim. The Commission is clearly not prepared to 
entertain the possibility that judicial officers share such 
beliefs and react to the victim accordingly. 176 In contra-
distinction to this attitude, it is submitted here that this 
is precisely the information which is required in an inquiry 
174. Supra 84-87. 
175. Report para 5.83. 
176. On the relationship between attitude and behaviour see 
Hilgard and Atkinson Introduction to Psychology 538: 
''An attitude represents both an orientation toward or 
away from object, concept, or situation and a readiness 
to respond in a predetermined manner to these or 
related objects, concepts, or situations.'' The 
research on cognitive dissonance indicates that 
individuals need to correlate their attitudes and 
behaviour as closely as possible. See, for example, 
Festinger and Carlsmith ''Cognitive Consequences of 
Forced Compliance'' 1959 Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology 203-210. 
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nto the complainant's experience dur· i ng the court 
iroceedings. 177 
:ONCLUSION 
Jltimately, the Report establishes that any problems the 
victims may have stem not from the legal rules themselves 
but from incorrect applications of the rules and are not 
embedded in the criminal justice system but flow from minor 
dysfunctions in its operation. Attention is deflected away 
from the institutionalised law enforcement mechanisms and 
directed towards individuals in the system. This is a 
process of trivialisation, clearly operative throughout the 
RE!port. By its unwavering orientation towards the male-
dominated status quo the Commission allows those agencies 
which control the operation of the criminal. justice system 
to guide and control the reform impulse. This is a process 
of containment. The threat to the present legal and 
institutional status quo in the form of an impetus towards 
177. An American study of the attitudes of judges towards 
rape cases found that, in general, the judges divided 
the cases into three basic types, giving each type a 
different degree of credibility. The rapes were 
classified according to the judge's perception of the 
complainant: "the genuine victim" was believed and 
given a sympathetic hearing; "consensual victim" was 
perceived to be partly to blame for the event. Judges 
described this situation as "friendly rape", "assault 
with f c.d 1 ure to p 1 ease" and "breach of contract". The 
third category CJf complainant was the "vindictive 
female" who laid a falser-ape charge. Bohmer "Judicial 
Attitudes Toward Rape Victims'' in Chappell, Geis and 
Geis (eds), supra n113 161-169. See also Barber 
"Judge and jury attitudes to rape" 1974 7 Australia and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 157-172. 
real change, has been checked, turned on its head and made 
p,;~rt. of a II reform packagf~" which does lit t 1 e more than patch 
up the facade of the criminal justice process in respect of 
rape cases, while leaving the basic structures untouched. 
The power to produce knowledge includes the power to define 
what constitutes a problem and what constitutes a non-
problem and the power to decide which questions are relevant 
and which are irrelevant. The institutional authorities, 
through the Commission, have clearly exercised both these 
powers: The law enforcement agencies have been defined as 
a non-problem for the rape victim. Consequently, deeper 
questions pertaining to their structure and routine-? 
operation in respect of rape cases are simply irrelevant. 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to assess the significance of the Law Commission 
Report on Women and Sexual Offences in South Africa, it is 
necessary to address three related issues: The Report as a 
source of knowledge about South African society; the 
particular forum in which such knowledge is produced; and 
the wider political context in which this process occurs. 
In this work South Africa vJas identified as a "patriarcha.1 11 
society: a society in which men are the dominant social 
class. Dispite the differences in wealth, power and culture 
between the Af~ikaaner group, the English-speaking whites 
and the black population, the common feature of these groups 
is a marked sexual stratification. In each group women are 
usually poorer, less powerful and under the control of men. 
Although the specific forms of patriarchy differ <Bozzoli's 
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"pa.tchwor k qui 1 t of patr i a.rchi es 11 ) , the pre-eminence of men 
is the common feature of the groups. A full and detailed 
analysis of the nature and operation of patriarchy is beyond 
the scope of this work; nor can the controversies and 
disagreements over the concept be discussed. The following 
sketch of the concept of patriarchy adopted here will 
suffice for present purposes. 
Patriarchy is a system of sexual domination, the structures 
of which affect all areas of human life: the psychology, the 
socilisation processes, the economic activities and the life 
chances of men and women. The organisation of patriarchal 
society ensures that the greatest wealth, power, privilege 
and authority are consistently channelled to the dominant 
group of males. The material basis of patriarchy is 
reinforced by a belief system which accords social and moral 
superiority to men and by a male supremacist ideology which 
draws powerful support from religion, traditional morality, 
"natL1re 11 and II kn owl edge 11 • The st.ate and its social control 
mechanisms, including the criminal justice system, 
institutionalise the social order. The dominant ideology of 
patriarchy in turn legitimates its material base in a 
process of reciprocal support, thereby weaving the 
apparently seamless web of male control. 
Patriarchy may be conceptualised as a political system which 
institutionalises an imbalance of power between\ men and 
as its centra.l women. Feminist political theory poses 
concern the subordination of women and it enlarges the 
established conception of the political dom.;;\i n by 
emphasising that every area of life, even the "personal" or 
"private" sphere, is the sphere of male dominance and female 
resistance, in Millett's now famous term, the sphere of 
"sexual politics"s.. Patriarchy is thus similar to other 
political systems in which 
status and privileges 
those who rule enjoy power, 
denied to their political 
subordi na.tes. At the centre of their relations lies a 
1. Millett Sexual Politics. 
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conflict of interest: the concern of the ruling group is to 
maintain its position of superiority while the interest of 
the subordinate group is to change the balance of power. 
The dominant group does not maintain its position by force 
alone but by a variety of co-optive and coercive strategies 
in highly complex processes. The patriarchal order is 
maintained largely with the "consent" of women. This 
I 
consent is not spontaneous; it must be produced and 
continually reproduced. Patriarchal strategy co-opts women 
to its order by denying that the relations between the sexes 
are political or that there is a conflict of interest 
between them. It gains women's allegiance by positing a 
unity of interest between men and women and by allowing men 
to articulate those interests on behalf all. A perspective 
which challenges the dominant reality of male rule .tends to 
be viewed as deviant and to be marginalised. The Report's 
\ 
treatment of feminists and feminist ideas is a good example 
of this. 
The perpetuation of the patriarchal order cannot be 
accomplished solely by the engineering of cohsent to its 
major institutions. It relies also on the thre•t or use of 
violence towards women, not merely as a "fall-back" device 
when consensus fails, but as a permanent feature of the 
social organisation. It is thus bath necessary and normal 
even though its occurrence is often denied and much of it 
remains hidden from perception. 
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A crucial aspect of male power is the power to produce 
knowledge. In the words of Bunkie: 
"Men make knowledge. White, privileged men •••• 
This ability to define reality, to tell us what is 
objective, rational and important, is their basic 
power. Knowledge is the most important thing men 
make. It is the power to declare that their view 
is the truth - the only truth. Such knowledge 
makes women or indigenous peoples invisible. We 
Cie women or indigenous people] become deviants 
from the great white reasonable norm when we 
insist that what we do does c:ount." 2 
The social definition of reality is linked to the 
distribution of power in society. 
which constructs a male-centred 
It is the powerful group 
reality and produces 
knowledge. Codified theoretical knowledge about the world, 
and in particular about women, is produced mainly by men 
from within the dominant perspective in the form of books, 
theses, scientific research and commissions of inquiry. 
While this ,is an important source of "scientific:" knowledge 
which may lend legitimacy to the institutional order, the 
primary knowledge about this order is pre-theoretical and 
uncadified: 
"It is the sum total of 'what everybody knows' 
about a social world, an assemblage of maxims, 
morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and 
beliefs, myths ••• the theoretical integration of 
which requires considerable intellectual fortitude 
in itself •••• " 3 
The construction of reality, the production of knowledge and 
the exercise of male power are thus inextricably linked. 
2. Bunkle "Encyclopaedic Blunders" Broadsheet 7, cited in 
Spender For the Record 25. 
3. Berger and Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality 
83. 
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Male power has constructed the reality of the patriarchal 
order; it encodes and transmits its meanings and common-
sense knowledge in language; it declares deviance from its 
meanings a.nd its knowledge "unre.;i.l". 
This perspective of the wider socio-political context in 
which the Commission operates and the role of knowledge in 
the maintenance of the status qua provides the terms of 
reference in which to assess the Report. The Report 
purports to be a body of codified knowledge of women and 
sexual offences in South Africa. In fact, the Report 
contains little information about women generally or raped 
women in particular or about sexual offences in South 
African law. 
The knowledge found in the Report is neither neutral nor 
objective. It reflects the concerns and orientation of the 
particular forum in which it was generated the South 
African Law Commission - and the sexual - political context 
of which that forum is a part. The Law Commission is a 
permanent body whose members are usually legally qualified 
and are appointed by the State President. 4 The Chairman of 
the Commission is a judge of the Supreme Court.~ It is 
therefore a prestigious Commission of considerable authority 
with the power to influence the policy - and law-making 
4. Sec~ion 1(a) of the South African Law Commission Act 19 
o·f 1973. 
5. Section 3 ( 1) (a) of the Act. 
136 
processes in South Africa.~ • In the research process the 
Commission is both a user and a producer of knowledge: it 
draws upon codified <scientific/authoritative) ·knowledge and 
1.mc:adif ied (cultural/"rec:ipe") knowledge. When passed 
through the medium of the Commission, operating securely 
within the dominant patriarchal ideology and oriented 
towards the staate, the end result is a m~lange invested 
with particular status and authority. 
The major thrust of the Report an Women and Sexual Offences 
in South Africa is directed towards establishing three 
cardinal theses: 
(i) Rape is not a serious social problem in South Africa. 
(ii) The criminal justice system as presently operated 
( i i i ) 
does not pose any special, avoidable problems for the 
rape complainant. 
Challenges to propositions Ci) and (ii) arise from a 
group of foreign activists (feminists) whose views do 
not warrant serious consideration in South Africa. 
The principal aim of this work has been ta demonstrate that 
these findings are incorrect and that propositions (i) and 
6. The objects of the Commission are to investigate and 
research legal topics in order ta make recommendations 
for the development, improvement, modernisation or 
reform of the law (s4). To achieve its abjects, the 
Commission is empowered ta draw up research programmes, 
may consult any person or body in its investigations 
and may submit draft legislation to the Minister of 
Justice for consideration (s5). 
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(ii) are open to serious challenge. The Commission is 
highly selective in its use of materials and data sources: 
it chooses to ignore the considerable body of cross-cultural 
research on rape-related matters and South African 
victimological studies. Similarly, it pursues an apparently 
democratic information-gathering process by inviting comment 
from the public and by sending questionnaires to interested 
persons. Thus the impression is created of genuine public 
participation in the identification of and solution to 
matters of public concern, lending a gloss of legitimacy to 
the Commission, its investigation and, ultimately, the state 
which initiated it. In fact, however, the Commission 
display~ an unwavering bias towards the interests of the 
state as represented by the agents of the criminal justice 
system. Through the operation of a hierarchy of 
credibility, the Commission defers to opinions from these 
sources as authoritative. As demonstrated above, it is 
these opinions which shape the Commission's conclusions and 
recommendations, resulting in a notable bias towards the 
social and legal status quo. The over-representation of 
these views at the expense of other views supports 
F'retorius's argument that the most important "function" of 
state-appointed Commissions is an ideological one: to 
legitimate the existing socio-political order, whether this 
effect is intended or not. 7 The Commission's arguments for 
7. Pretorius "Suid-Afrikaanse Kommissies van Ondersoek: 'n 
Sosi ol ogi ese Studi e" (unpublished PhD thesis) , 
University of Stellenbosch 1985, 321-322 
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he retention of the status quo are ideological in the 
(Jl 1 owing sense: 
"Individual (or sets of) claims, perspectives and 
philosophies can be regarded as ideological if 
they conceal or mask social contradictions on 
behalf of a dominant class or group. For example, 
forms of consciousness are ideological in so far 
as they claim to represent generalizable interests 
but conceal the particular and sectarian interests 
of the ruling class and/or in so far as they 
maintain that societal outcomes represent natural 
ones, when they are the result of particular 
constellations of social relations; and/or in so 
far as they glorify the social situation as 
harmonious, when it is in fact conflict ridden." 63 
As is evident from the Report the Commission justifies the 
present law and law enforcement process by these methods. 
The Report reproduces the dominant patriarchal view of rape: 
rape as an isolated act of deviance without implications for 
the relations between the sexes; the rape-related myths are 
preserved; and rape victims effectively silenced. The 
political dimension to issues such as the content of the 
procedural and evidentiary law or representation for the 
complainant is denied in the Report. The issues are dealt 
with on a technical level only: the technicalities of the 
law and the legal system are used to support an ideological 
position. The Commission's conclusions and ultimate 
recommendations, while they contain progressive elements, 
remain firmly within the bounds of the dominant interests. 
The feminist-inspired challenge to the dominant ideology is 
anihilated and feminists are cast into the role of 
8. Cited in Pretorius supra n7 18. 
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scapegoats: it is their activities which stirred up the 
public concern about rape. 
The Report also reproduces components of the dominant 
ideology of patriarchy. It reflects some of the ideas 
current amongst Bhe elite group of white, middle-class men 
whose views predominate in the Report. The Report is thus 
an important source of information about the dominant ideas 
the nature and status of women~ on raped women, on rapists 
and on the criminal justice system in South Africa. It is 
therefore not surprising that the agents of the criminal 
justice system an organisations which represents and 
enforces the interests and values of the powerful group -
are not subject to critical scrunity. A close reading of 
the Report informs the reader more about the powerful group 
in South African society and their views than about women 
and sexual offences. The knowledge which emerges from the 
Report includes the following: 
(i) The dominant group does not define rape as a serious 
social issue requiring special attention. 
(ii) It believes that the content of the law and its 
(ii i ) 
enforcement are fundamentally fair to rape victims. 
It, accepts tt-iat the image of the nature of women 
which is encoded into the law is true and accurate. 
(iv) The cultural myths relating to women and rape are 
operative in our society. Although it is not certain 
exactly which myths are current nor the extent to 
which.they are adhered, it is certain that those 





which are reflected in the law itself are not 
questioned by sections of the dominant group. In 
addition, it is clear from the Report that the myth 
of the "tr·ue rape" is widely believed .... 
Although the Report recommends some change to the present 
/law which may be regarded as progressive, it remains firmly 
within the bounds of the dominant patriarchal ideology 
operative in South Africa today. l,Jhat ideal ogy defines rape 
as a private misfortune for the victim, without wider 
social, cultural or political significance. It mL1st be 
remembered that the investigation was initiated as a result 
of expressed public concern about the treatment of the rape 
complainant by the criminal justice system. Such 
widespread, vocalised concern contains a potential threat to 
the sta~us qua in that it may pose a challenge to the 
definition of rape as a private trouble. The Law Commission 
Report must be seen a~ a response to this potential threat. 
It attempts to check the impulse to reconceptualise rape as 
a social issue which demands an effective, state-supported, 
social solution. 1 ~ By identifying local concern for the 
fate of rape victims with foreign feminists groups, the 
Report attempts to liquidate the challenge to the sexual 
status quo and ta reassert the dominant view of rape. It 
9. See Report para 2.42. 
1121. On the distinction between "private troubles" and 
"public issues" see C Wright Mills The Sociological 
Imagination Chapter 1. 
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reaffirms the definition of rape as a private trouble for 
the victim and denies the social and political dimensions to 
the rape problem. 11 As such, the Report does not encourage 
progress; on the contrary, it represents strong resistence 
to genuine reform. 
11. This is an anti-feminist stance. It was directly as a 
result of feminist anti-rape movements in other 
countries that rape was re-defined as a social problem. 
See Rose ''Rape as a Social Problem: A Byproduct of the 
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